

TDVİA 8 (1993), 289–90; see also Rafet Atalay, Tarihçi Çeşmizade Mustafa Reşid'in edebî kişiliği, *Türklük Bilimi Araştırmaları* 18 (2005), 17–29; Bernard Lewis, *Çeşmizâde, Eİ2*.

the Ottomans briefly occupied Tabrîz but did not pursue the defeated army, and, facing increasingly severe problems of logistics and morale, and they returned to Istanbul after wintering at Amâsyâ. As for the Şafavids, Shâh Ismâ'îl had survived and retained his throne, but his reputation as a divinely supported conqueror was irreparably damaged, and he spent the remainder of his reign hunting and drinking rather than fighting.

For the Şafavids, the defeat of their formerly invincible "perfect guide" (*murshid-i kâmil*) was an event that required explanation. Shâh Tahmâsp (r. 930–84/1524–76), Ismâ'îl's own son and successor, grumbles in his *Tadhkirat* (29) that Ismâ'îl was tricked into fighting by his lieutenant Dürmish Khân, and that the Qizilbâsh had been drinking on the eve of battle. Şafavid court historians, for their part, gloss over the rout as a tactical pause by Shâh Ismâ'îl to gather more troops (Khwândamîr 606, Iskandar Beg 70–1). Outside official circles, the popular memory of the loss at Châldirân is preserved in Persian coffeehouse tales of the twelfth/seventeenth century. Some attribute the disaster to Ottoman perfidy: It is claimed that Shâh Ismâ'îl sent a message to Sulţân Selim before the battle urging him to swear an oath not to fire his cannons on the grounds that it would be unmanly to do so, but when the battle threatened to turn in favour of the Şafavids, Selim's grand vizier gave the order for the cannons to fire, pointing out that he had sworn no such oath (Muntazir Şâhib 523–4; Shukrî 489–91). Another explanation offered is that Shâh Ismâ'îl's prideful disdain for Selim and the Ottomans led God to chastise him on account of his arrogance (Muntazir Şâhib 520; Shukrî 492).

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## Châldirân, Battle of

The **Battle of Châldirân** was a clash between the Şafavid and Ottoman armies on 2 Rajab 920/23 August 1514 in north-western Azerbaijan; it ended in a complete rout for the Şafavids (907–1135/1501–1722), who lost eastern Anatolia and even, briefly, their capital of Tabrîz, in its aftermath. It also spelled the end of the military career of Shâh Ismâ'îl I (r. 907–30/1501–24). The battle marked the climax of tensions between the rising Şafavid state and its Ottoman rival, tensions that had been intensifying since the ascension of Selim (Selîm) I (r. 918–26/1512–20) to the throne. Determined to quash the political and sectarian threat on his eastern flank, Selim marched across Anatolia in the summer of 920/1514 at the head of an army of several hundred thousand men, who dragged with them the cannons that would decide the battle. According to the sources, the Şafavids held a council of war even as the Ottomans were digging in, and it was suggested to Shâh Ismâ'îl that he attack immediately. Ismâ'îl is said to have scoffed at this advice, holding it as beneath him to act like a caravan-raider (Iskandar Beg, 68). The Ottomans were thus allowed to fortify their positions, and this proved fatal. Already outnumbered, the Şafavids were decimated by Ottoman cannon fire, and numerous Qizilbâsh commanders were killed; Shâh Ismâ'îl himself narrowly escaped capture. After the battle,