

67. Leşker ez taht-ı Sitanbul süy-ı İnan tahtem / *Sübh-ser* ra garka-ı hun-ı melamet sahtem. Akçay, 'Bir Propaganda Aracı', p. 204.
68. For further details, see Babayan, *Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs*; Babayan, 'The Safavid Synthesis', pp. 135–61; Abisaab, *Converting Persia*. Babayan argues that the tension between the spiritual landscape of *Kızılbaş* Islam and the newly adopted imperial religion, Imami Shiism, intensified in the seventeenth century, even though it had existed from the very beginning of Safavid rule. With the gradual establishment of Twelver Shiite dogma at the Safavid court, *Kızılbaş* belief became increasingly marginalised and was finally condemned as heresy. While Safavid conversion efforts continued in Anatolia in the following decades, imperial orders after the 1630s do not refer to them with the same frequency. Either the number of *halifes* sent to Anatolia by the Safavid central authority declined or the Ottoman central authority began to pay less attention to them.
69. Rudi Matthee cogently argues that the Treaty of Zuhab, signed in 1639, ended a century and a half of intermittent Safavid–Ottoman hostility and revitalised the Anatolian overland trade route, which was no longer threatened by warfare and commercial boycotts. Moreover, improving maritime contacts between the two empires, as well as the abolition of restrictions on travel and trade across Ottoman borders caused the *Kızılbaş* emirs of the Safavid court to lose leverage. Matthee, *The Politics of Trade*, pp. 75–85.
70. Dressler, 'Inventing Orthodoxy', pp. 151–73. On the other hand, a few sources show Safavid conversion activities continuing after the 1630s. In one document, Çeşmi Efendi, the qadi, or judge, of Constantinople in the late 1620s and the *kadıasker*, or supreme judge, of Anadolu for Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623–40), reports some *millahide*, or heretics, living in Constantinople. While Çeşmi Efendi does not mention the word Safavid or *Kızılbaş* in his report, it is clear whom he means: 'When they were asked about their *mürşid* [spiritual guide], they all said Shah Abbas.' Moreover, Çeşmi Efendi, after mentioning that these 'heretics' recite the *manis*, or couplets, of Shah Ismail Hatayi in their secret gatherings, ends his short report with prayers for their extermination. Minorsky, 'Shaykh Bali-Efendi', pp. 448–50.
71. Winter, 'The *Kızılbaş* of Syria', p. 181.
72. For an example, see the Ottoman chronicler Şemdanizade Süleyman Efendi (d. 1779)'s *Mür'it-Tevarih* and his description of the events of 1730–5, which marked a military conflict between the Ottomans and Nader Shah (d. 1747), who brought an end to the Safavids when he emerged as the first ruler of the Afsharid Dynasty in Iran (r. 1736–96). Şem'dani-zade, *Mür'it-Tevarih*.
73. Erginbaş, 'Problematizing Ottoman Sunnism,' p. 620.

Reappraising Ottoman Religiosity in the Last Decades of the Sixteenth Century: Mustafa Darir's *Siret* and its Alid Content

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Introduction

The past decade has witnessed a proliferation of studies on Ottoman religiosity.¹ These studies locate Ottoman religious culture in its domestic and international contexts and argue that the Ottoman state followed a path similar to its Habsburg and Safavid rivals in drawing confessional boundaries.² In this milieu of 'confessionalisation', the Ottomans, who traditionally adhered to the Sunni branch of Islam, solidified their Sunni identity vis-à-vis its political rivals. On the other hand, within the empire, through its close watch, deterrence and sometimes outright destruction of 'unorthodox/heretical' individuals and groups,³ the Ottoman state apparatus became almost militantly Sunni from the early sixteenth century onward. The sixteenth century has therefore been identified as a watershed moment in this Sunnification campaign, as the Ottoman state had gone to extremes to deal with Safavid sympathisers in Anatolia by massacring them wherever they were found. Certain prominent members of the Ottoman ulema also participated in this effort by denouncing various sects and groups and legitimising their destruction with reference to Islamic law.⁴ Moreover, in the seventeenth century, this trend of Sunnitisation gained new steam with the birth of populist and puritan movements, such as the *Kadıızadeli*s. This growing emphasis on uniformity and conformity led to the policing of public behaviour, building new mosques to demonstrate pious acts of patronage and patrolling the prayer attendance.⁵ Furthermore, recent studies have examined Islamic catechisms that discuss proper religious behaviour, which were meant to educate the lay public, and had become widespread thanks to the efforts that aimed towards a popularisation of a 'Sunna-minded orthodoxy'.⁶

In contrast to this trend, in his final *magnum opus*, the late Shahab