

278643

DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE DELL'EDUCAZIONE E DEI PROCESSI CULTURALI E FORMATIVI
 Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione, Università degli Studi di Firenze

ISTITUTO E MUSEO DI STORIA DELLA SCIENZA
 Università degli Studi di Firenze

CENTRE D'HISTOIRE DES SCIENCES ET DES PHILOSOPHIES ARABES ET MÉDIÉVALES
 CNRS Paris

CIRCOLAZIONE DEI SAPERI NEL MEDITERRANEO

FILOSOFIA E SCIENZE (SECOLI IX-XVII)

CIRCULATION DES SAVOIRS AUTOUR DE LA MÉDITERRANÉE

PHILOSOPHIE ET SCIENCES (IX^e-XVII^e SIÈCLE)

Atti del VII Colloquio Internazionale
 della Société Internationale d'Histoire des Sciences
 et de la Philosophie Arabes et Islamiques

Firenze, 16-28 febbraio 2006

a cura di

GRAZIELLA FEDERICI VESCOVINI e AHMAD HASNAWI

Edizioni Cadmo
 2013

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi Kütüphanesi	
Dem. No:	278649
Tas. No:	501 COL-1

01 Temmuz 2021

MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN
 SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

Farabi (060050)
 Ibn Sina (090637)
 Ibn Rüşd (090606)

AHMAD HASNAWI
 CNRS, UMR 7219, Paris

L'ÂGE DE LA DÉMONSTRATION.
 LOGIQUE, SCIENCE ET HISTOIRE:
 AL-FĀRĀBĪ, AVICENNE, AVEMPACE, AVERROËS

Selon les philosophes de l'islam classique, on entre, avec Aristote, dans un âge d'achèvement des sciences, un âge où celles-ci auraient atteint un statut *démonstratif*. Al-Fārābī (m. 950), Avicenne (m. 1037), Avempace (m. 1139), Averroès (m. 1198) partagent tous la même vision de la genèse et du développement des savoirs, laquelle consiste à projeter sur cette évolution le schéma des types d'arguments, développé dans l'*Organon* systématisé des commentateurs. Dans ce schéma, les arguments démonstratifs occupent le sommet de l'échelle, suivis, selon un ordre épistémique décroissant, par les arguments dialectiques, puis sophistiques et enfin rhétoriques. Cette projection, qui inverse l'ordre épistémique, s'accompagne d'une vision totalisante: chaque stade, caractérisé par l'usage de tel type d'arguments, n'est pas marqué seulement comme un stade de l'évolution de la logique, entendue comme une discipline spéciale. Dans cette reconstruction historique telle qu'opérée par ces philosophes, le type d'arguments dont on use à un moment donné n'est pas une simple enveloppe extérieure dans laquelle viendraient se couler des contenus identiques; il fonctionne comme l'outil d'investigation dont disposent les hommes à ce stade de leur histoire, outil qui définit ainsi le type de vérités auquel ils ont accès. Les outils logiques dont on dispose formeraient pour ainsi dire l'horizon qui borne l'activité théorique et pratique des hommes. Je tâcherai d'abord d'établir que tous ces philosophes cités partagent cette vision; j'en explorerai ensuite brièvement quelques conséquences. Deux de ces conséquences ont un caractère historique: l'une est la manière dont cette grille de lecture de l'histoire du savoir a pu jouer un rôle de filtrage à l'égard de la tradition grecque, déterminant ainsi ce qui de celle-ci pouvait passer à l'aire nouvelle, ou plutôt la forme de viabilité qu'il pouvait y recevoir; l'autre est la manière dont cette grille a permis de circonscrire la validité et les limites des nouvelles disciplines "particulières" ou "positives" nées à l'ombre de la nouvelle religion révélée, en particulier de la discipline du *kalām* ou théologie spéculative. Je traiterai séparément de ces deux effets. Les deux autres conséquences que j'envisagerai sont de nature plus "épistémologique": l'une concerne la manière dont doit maintenant s'exposer une discipline "scientifique"; l'autre, qui lui est étroitement liée, concerne le rôle de la dialectique sous son aspect d'investigation des principes des disciplines scientifiques.

278643

Farabi

060050

DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE DELL'EDUCAZIONE E DEI PROCESSI CULTURALI E FORMATIVI
 Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione, Università degli Studi di Firenze

ISTITUTO E MUSEO DI STORIA DELLA SCIENZA
 Università degli Studi di Firenze

CENTRE D'HISTOIRE DES SCIENCES ET DES PHILOSOPHIES ARABES ET MÉDIÉVALES
 CNRS Paris

TERENCE J. KLEVEN
 Central College, Pella, Iowa

AL-FĀRĀBĪ'S FIVE APHORISMS ON LOGIC

CIRCOLAZIONE DEI SAPERI
 NEL MEDITERRANEO

FILOSOFIA E SCIENZE (SECOLI IX-XVII)

CIRCULATION DES SAVOIRS
 AUTOUR DE LA MÉDITERRANÉE

PHILOSOPHIE ET SCIENCES (IX^e-XVII^e SIÈCLE)

Atti del VII Colloquio Internazionale
 della Société Internationale d'Histoire des Sciences
 et de la Philosophie Arabes et Islamiques

Firenze, 16-28 febbraio 2006

01 Temmuz 2021

MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN
 SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

a cura di

GRAZIELLA FEDERICI VESCOVINI e AHMAD HASNAWI

Edizioni Cadmo
 2013

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi Kütüphanesi	
Dem. No:	278649
Tas. No:	501 001.1

"To anyone trained in the science of
 literature – that is, in logic – ..."

(al-Fārābī's, *The Harmonization of the Opinions
 of the Two Sages: Plato the Divine and Aristotle*,
 section 3).

I wish to dedicate whatever is useful and enduring in this essay to Professor Muhsin Mahdi. I had the privilege of studying with Professor Mahdi at Harvard University when I was a postdoctoral Bradley Fellow at Boston College. His scholarship has made al-Fārābī, who is perhaps the finest of Islamic philosophers, an enduring legacy for Islam and for humanity. Subsequent generations of scholars will remain in debt to Mahdi's monumental accomplishments in making al-Fārābī's writings available both in critical Arabic editions and in translations. I also wish to thank the American Research Center in Egypt and the Earhart Foundation for Fellowships which have made possible my studies on al-Fārābī.

Al-Fārābī's Verbal Art in His Five Logical Aphorisms

In the introductory paragraph of an essay entitled "Philosophic Literature", Muhsin Mahdi makes the following statement regarding Arabic philosophic writing:

Arabic philosophic writing is a form of Arabic literature. Like Arabic poetry and artful prose it employs generally accepted opinions, rhetorical reasoning and devices, and imaginative projections to persuade and move an audience with particular linguistic and cultural habits, traditions and inclinations, and it responds to particular questions and deals with particular problems, which in turn shape its style and manner of exposition¹.

¹ M. Mahdi, "Philosophical Literature," M. J. L. Young, J. D. Latham and R. B. Serjeant, eds., *Religion, Learning and Science in the Abbasid Period*, The Cambridge History of Arabic Literature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 76.



Alfarabi's Book of Dialectic (Kitāb al-Jadal): On the Starting Point of Islamic Philosophy

By DAVID M. DiPASQUALE (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), xxiii + 338 pp. Price HB £81.00. EAN 978-1108417532.

rev. G. A. Colmo

In his Preface to this rich and fertile study of Alfarabi, David M. DiPasquale tells us that Alfarabi spent eight years of his life in Harran 'and throughout Byzantium studying Greek science with those whom he would later describe as "carrying the books with them"' (p. xii). His indispensable English translation of Alfarabi's *Book of Dialectic (Kitāb al-Jadal)* and his pregnant, thought-provoking commentary give abundant evidence that DiPasquale has been 'carrying the books' with him for decades in pursuit of the question 'why philosophy?' (p. 188). This is a question that arises from the outset and never really goes away. Any reader who shares with DiPasquale an attachment to this question will benefit enormously from both his translation and his commentary.

The thesis of this important book is that underneath 'the shimmering façade of demonstrative science' (p. 249), Alfarabi is aware of a dilemma. All science is based on prior knowledge, and that knowledge is prescientific (p. 118). Science must of necessity arise from non-science. It must be rooted in what Alfarabi calls generally accepted opinions (pp. 245, 125, 129). But these generally accepted opinions are mere beliefs, and mere belief is fatal to all philosophy (pp. 186, 219). The starting point of all philosophy, and not just Islamic philosophy, is the attempt to ascend from opinion to knowledge. Dialectic is the instrument whereby we sort through the contradictions of generally accepted opinion (pp. 163-4), leaving behind what is false or unknowable (pp. 187-8). DiPasquale makes explicit a crucial assumption in the dialectical ascent from opinion to knowledge. The generally accepted opinions from which we begin must contain some truth. '[T]he ascent from opinion to knowledge is necessitated by the opinions themselves because there is truth to be found in opinion as such' (p. 209). 'Why philosophy?': it is necessitated by the opinions themselves because it 'brings to light the truth that is hidden in opinion' (p. 188). And since opinion is expressed in language, language itself must be able to reveal something true. 'To admit that words signify something real, and that meaning can be conveyed from one individual to another using them, is to concede a great deal' (p. 255). Dialectic does indeed concede these things, and on this basis it can begin to sort out the beings into classes and kinds by which we say '[w]hat a thing is' (pp. 175, 183). What had been a chaos of generally accepted but conflicting opinions can be sorted into a *kosmos* of distinguishable beings (p. 220; see the summary on p. 262).

'[T]he generally accepted premises are fundamental because they form the character of a given political order. . . Before one is a philosopher, one is a member of a community, tribe, or nation' (p. 129). But the dialectical activity which is essential to the philosopher also 'makes him obnoxious to those people who preserve the atmosphere within which civil society lives and flourishes' (p. 182). Philosophy inevitably comes into conflict with those who hold dear

the generally accepted opinions out of which the activity of philosophy originates. It is for this reason that DiPasquale goes so far as to speak of 'the fundamentally political nature of all philosophizing' (p. 187).

This is the philosophic argument of DiPasquale's commentary as I understand it, and it is a formidable argument. He also makes historical arguments, of which I will mention only two. One is that Alfarabi's turn to dialectic should be understood in terms of the famous Socratic turn or 'second sailing' found in the *Phaedo* and the *Parmenides*. Alfarabi has recovered the original meaning of Socrates' turn to speeches, 'arguably the most important [event] in the long history of philosophy' (p. 159). DiPasquale makes the connection between Alfarabi and the Socratic turn based on the reference to the *Parmenides* in the *Jadal* (pp. 32, 159).

The second historical claim is that Alfarabi makes a 'united front' with Aristotle in realizing the hypothetical character of demonstrative science and turning to dialectic to decide more fundamental questions (pp. 231, 245 n.11).

I fully agree with what I take to be the most important argument of DiPasquale's book to the effect that Alfarabi was wholly aware of the limits of demonstrative science.¹ The body of his commentary makes a strong case against the assumptions that for Alfarabi 'philosophy is purely demonstrative' and that Alfarabi is 'tied to the opinion that the goals of logic are strictly demonstrative' (p. 280), assumptions he attributes to Deborah Black, whose book is the subject of his concluding chapter. DiPasquale compresses Alfarabi's reservations about demonstration into the following question. 'If this science, which appears to promise so much, is based on syllogisms which are themselves based on an inductive ascent from particulars, how can it escape from that contingency which is coeval with those particulars?' (p. 268). Here the universals of the demonstrative syllogism are 'based on an inductive ascent from particulars' and cannot escape from contingency. In this limited sense, no ascent is possible. I agree with DiPasquale that Alfarabi posed the question about the demonstrative syllogism in terms of a radical questioning of the starting point or premises of such a syllogism.

But this fundamental agreement leads me to some reservations about the historical positions DiPasquale takes. What is Alfarabi's starting point? Does he begin with a return to Socrates' 'second sailing', or does he take his bearings from a logical critique of the demonstrative syllogism? As DiPasquale points out,

¹ Deborah Black, *Logic and Aristotle's 'Rhetoric' and 'Poetics' in Medieval Arabic Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 1990). As regards these assumptions, Black's position is supported by Joep Lameer, *Al-Farabi and Aristotelian Syllogistics: A Greek Theory and Islamic Practice* (Leiden: Brill, 1994). In support of his position, DiPasquale cites the short article by Miriam Galston, 'Al-Farabi on Aristotle's theory of demonstration' in Parvis Morewedge (ed.), *Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism* (Delmar: Caravan Books, 1981): 23-34, but not the much fuller treatment in her 'Opinion and knowledge in Farabi's understanding of Aristotle's philosophy', PhD diss. University of Chicago, 1973. I have discussed the opposing arguments of Galston and Lameer in Colmo, *Breaking with Athens: Alfarabi as Founder* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005): 37-54.

Journal of Islamic Studies, c. 32, sy. 1, 2020 Oxford.

MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTA
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN:

01 Temmuz 2021