

- 76 Maha Abdelrahman, "'With the Islamists? – Sometimes. With the State? – Never!' Co-Operation between the Left and Islamists in Egypt," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no.1 (2009): 37–54.
- 77 Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers, 185–195*, and Al-Arian, *Answering the Call*, 176–220.
- 78 El-Nawawy and Elmasry, *Revolutionary Egypt*, and Noha Mellor, *Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood. Da'wa, Discourse and Political Communication* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).
- 79 Brooke, *Winning Hearts and Votes*, 121–134.
- 80 Steven Brooke, *The Muslim Brotherhood's Social Outreach after the Egyptian Coup. Working Paper* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015), and Brown and Dunne, *Unprecedented Pressures*.
- 81 Lia, *The Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, 154–156.
- 82 Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood, 196–246*; Beverly Milton-Edwards, *The Muslim Brotherhood. The Arab Spring and its Future Face* (New York: Routledge, 2016), and Pargeter, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 61–176.
- 83 Tadros, "The Brotherhood Divided."
- 84 Roel Meijer and Edwin Bakker, *Transnationalizing Islam: The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe* (London: Hurst, 2011), and Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

26 Ekim 2023

MADE YAYIMLANDIKTAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

Fas

060078

6

ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS AND PARTY POLITICS

Two competing visions in Morocco

Esen Kırdış

Introduction

Why do some Islamic movements form Islamic political parties, while others do not? In particular, why has the Justice and Spirituality Movement, the largest Islamic movement in Morocco, rejected any plan to form a political party and continued to work as an informal social movement thereby risking regime repression, while its counterpart, the Movement for Unity and Reform, formed by the splitters of the radical Islamic Youth Movement, decided to enter party politics under the banner of the Party for Justice and Development Party, the incumbent party of Morocco today? This is an important question to ask theoretically and methodologically.

Islamists, as Akbarzadeh has convincingly demonstrated, have a political vision informed by a flexible reinterpretation and re-evaluation of religious texts and history. In this, political Islam presents a 'dynamic social phenomenon – not a static ideology.'¹ Hence, diverse Islamic political actors have taken divergent political paths to accomplish their political visions based on their unique reinterpretations and re-evaluations. In order to understand such dynamism of and diversity within political Islam, this chapter looks at the differentiation between Islamic movements eschewing party politics and Islamic political parties. It does so because Islamic movements and Islamic political parties diverge in their means and goals, and thus in their political impacts. While Islamic movements work outside institutional channels in their quest to challenge the regime's status quo as the voice of the marginalized, Islamic political parties aim to win 'votes, office and/or policy'² to demand representation within the regime. Because Islamic movements and Islamic political parties diverge in their means (utilizing informal versus formal channels) and goals (voicing unrepresented demands outside of institutional politics versus demanding representation within institutional politics), they have different impacts on the regime and its socio-political hegemony. Specifically, Islamic movements eschewing party politics, on the one hand, pose a democratic challenge to the regime, but on the other hand, they do not work within democratic politics. Meanwhile, Islamic political parties, although accepting the need to function within democratic politics, are not necessarily democratic actors themselves in their acceptance of the rules of an authoritarian regime like that of Morocco.

Fas
060078

T

Tazmamart

Tazmamart (Ar., Tāzmāmārt) was a secret prison, where military personnel and a few civilians were forcibly detained for various periods between 1973 and 1991, when an international human-rights campaign forced Morocco to release the survivors and demolish the two buildings where they had been imprisoned (Hay'at al-Insāf, 63). Despite the evidence collected by human-rights activists in France during 1980s, the Moroccan authorities denied the existence of Tazmamart until 1991 (Dalle, 513).

Named for a southeastern Moroccan village in the present-day governorate of Errachidia (al-Rāshīdiyya), Tazmamart was located in an old French military garrison that was built close to the Algerian border. Moroccan authorities repurposed it to serve as a jail for fifty-eight of the sixty-two military members who were still imprisoned in the high-security prison in Kenitra for participating in either of the coups d'état against King Ḥasan II (r.1961–99), in 1971 and 1972. A paratrooper named Miloudi Siddiq (Milūdi Šiddīq) was also imprisoned there in the

1980s. In addition, Tazmamart served as a secret jail for three businessmen and distant cousins of King Ḥasan II, the Bourequat (Būrikāt) brothers, who were taken from their house in Rabat in 1973 only to reemerge in Paris in 1991 (Amnesty International, 1991; Bourequat). The most plausible explanation for their arrest is that the king abused his power to settle a private account with them. That Tazmamart was a transnational operation was confirmed by the brief detention of a dozen soldiers from an unknown Francophone sub-Saharan African country (al-Marzūqī, 123–7). Because of the secrecy surrounding the prison, the local population was subject to draconian security measures that infringed on their mobility and civic rights (Būdirqa and Binyūb, 128).

Tazmamart prisoners are a classic case of enforced disappearance, in which “persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will,” constituting a crime against humanity (United Nations General Assembly, 1). After the 1972 military trials, defendants sentenced to two years or less were released, but the sixty-two who received longer sentences, ranging from three years to life, were sent to the

26 Ekim 2023

HAJDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

S. 152-154