

Podalia under the Ottoman rule. Eyalet-i Kamanice 1672–1699
[summary]

The aim of this work is to present the history of Kam"ancé Podilia (Polish, Kamaniec Podolski), Turkish, Kamaniec, a fortress an a city of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (present-day Ukraine), which was conquered by the Ottomans in 1672 and formed an Islamic bulwark in Eastern Europe until the Karlowitz treaty of 1699. In 1672–1699 the city was the center of a regular Ottoman province (eyalet) of Podolia and enabled strengthening the Ottoman control over Moldavia and Wallachian principalities, Crimean Tatars, and – last but not least – the Ukrainian Cossacks. The Polish participation in the relief of Vienna (1683) can be better understood only if studied together with the problem of Kamancé.

In the introduction the author addresses certain reasons of the hitherto existing stereotypes about the Ottoman Empire. Then he describes the most interesting Ottoman sources used in this monograph, and presents several problems concerning their language, script, transcription, and chronology. The first part serves a Polish reader as a general directory of the Ottoman Empire. The author reminds the history of the formation of Ottoman provinces, their administration, bureaucracy, and garrisons. Then he reminds the long discussion about the "Ottoman feudalism" and the institution of timar At the end some new tendencies in Ottoman studies are referred to. The importance of a "dynamization" of the Ottoman history is also stressed.

The second part presents a detailed chronology of events in Podolia in 1672–1699 placed in a general background of the Polish-Ottoman relations in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the situation in Eastern Europe after 1667, and the internal Ottoman problems, which the Kasprowicz vicissor had to deal with. Many hitherto unpublished sources, such as both Polish and Turkish letters and diaries, spies' and prisoners' reports, travellers relations, and day-books of the Polish hetman Stanislaw Jabłonowski are presented here. The Ottoman chronicles of Stahidar, Rapíd, Defterdar Mehmed, Abdi, and Hacı Ali are collated with Polish and other Christian reports.

According to the author, neither economic, nor demographic, nor political reasons should account for the war of 1672. Contrary to common views, Podolia was not a rich province, at least not during the second half of the seventeenth century. Since the fifteenth century the Polish economy had been tied to the export of cereals and forest products to Western Europe. Cheap transport was possible only because of great rivers that flowed north. Meanwhile, all the rivers in Podolia flowed in the "wrong" direction – towards the Black Sea. Italian projects for exporting Ukrainian products through the Black Sea had already failed in the sixteenth century. Traditionally, only the Ottomans were accused of blocking these attempts, but it was the Polish Senate that decided not to open the Dniester trade because of the fear that this would show the Turkish galleys the way to Poland; it was more prudent to leave the Ukrainian borderland undeveloped rather than to tempt the Ottomans. These fears are better understood if we remember that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, with a population three times smaller, had a state budget about thirty times smaller than that of the Ottoman Empire.

The same reasons that led to the underdevelopment of Podolia under Polish-Lithuania could have enabled its development as a base within the Ottoman Black Sea system for provisioning Constantinople. To achieve this, however, intensive colonisation and settlement were necessary. Yet, from the end of the sixteenth century, the demographic pressure within the Ottoman Empire itself declined sharply. It was unlikely that the Ottomans, having failed to colonize the Hungarian plain and the shores of the Black Sea in Black Sea and Yedisan, would succeed in colonizing even more remote Podolia.

Political factors should have also prevented the Ottomans from attacking Poland in 1672. This attack seemingly contradicted the traditional Ottoman northern policy in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The main concern of this policy was to preserve equilibrium between the main rivals, Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy. In 1667, after the catastrophe of Khotkó, the uprising and the wars against Sweden, Russia, and Transylvania, the Commonwealth was forced to cede Smolensk and a great part of Eastern Ukraine, including Kiev, to Russia. Polish historians consider this date a turning point in the relations between the two states. Given these circumstances, an Ottoman attack against the Commonwealth could only strengthen Russia.

This war was, in addition, very unpopular among the Ottoman soldiers. Poland was considered a remote and cold country; it did not offer great spoils and could not even feed the invading army. The road through the Balkans and Moldavia was long and exhausting. Poor systems of communication excluded any greater Ottoman territorial gain in Eastern Europe. Paul Kennedy's term of "strategic overextension" is applicable not only to the Hungarian and Persian limitations on Ottoman growth, but also to the Polish-Ukrainian limitations. It was not accidental that almost all the Ottoman-Polish truces were signed at the end of October. The Turks preferred to be home by November, the day when peasants paid the second installment of the timar and other taxes. If one considers that one month was necessary for assembling troops, at least one month was needed to reach the Polish border, and at least one month more to return home, the time available for effective campaigning was very limited...
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The real reason why the great Ottoman statesmen, Ahmed Köprüliği, decided to attack Poland, seems to be the Cossack question. From the „classical” point of view, the Cossack raids on the Black Sea were considered a just revenge made by a desperate Ukrainian population in reaction to the Tatar raids. These „revenges” however, were usually directed not against the Tatars but against the rich Turkish towns and villages on the Black See. Whereas the Tatars primarily sacked Ukrainian towns and villages that were of lesser economic importance.
gyroics to various patrons elsewhere. Nevertheless, he travelled to Khârazm, and visited Rayy, Nîshâpûr and Tabaristan, a journey which he himself says, took no less than three years. The resentment of local patrons, the death of a son by drowning and the loss of a brother, physical sufferings, especially dry scab (qarâf), ophthalmia, and tooth-ache, are the other autobiographical details which he mentions in his diwân. Kamâl devoted a large part of his work to the praise of the leaders of two particular nations of Iṣfâhân, the Shâhî ʿAlî Khudjiân and the Ḥanâfî ʿAlî Sâdî. Among other patrons to whom he dedicated panegyrics are: ʿAli al-Dîn Tektîsh (566/1172-566/1199) and Sultan Dâlîal al-Dîn [q.v.] (617/1218-623/1229) of the Khârazmshâhls [q.v.], Atâbâk Saʿd b. Zangât (ca. 594/1197-623/1226) and his son Abû Bakr (623/1226-656/1260) of the Saḫûrûdids, and Îsâmî al-Dawwâlî Ardâshîr (d. 623/1228) and his son Shârâf al-Muliwî Ḥâsan (d. 623/1229) of the Isphahâbâd of Tâbaristân. He also wrote mystical odes in honour of the well-known Shâhî al-Dîn ʿUmarî Suhrawardî [q.v.] (d. 623/1228), whom he is said to have paid homage as a devotee (murtid). He apparently did not meet the shaykh, but certainly received letters from him since a unique copy of at least one letter has survived (see MDAT, 14). Dâlîal Shâh tells us that toward the end of his days, Kamâl adopted an ascetic life and retired to a hermitage situated outside Iṣfâhân, where he was tortured and killed by the Mongols. According to Dâlîal Shâh, this happened in 635/1237-8. Other sources give 628/1230-1 and 639/1241-2, both improbable.

As a panegyrist Kamâl is admired and imitated by no less a poet than ʿAlîsâ. His poetry is polished and rich in original ideas. The homorific title Khâlîq al-Mâlîk (Creator of Sublime Ideas), by which he is mentioned in some tadhkirâs, does not occur earlier than Dâlîal and Dâlîal Shâh; it refers to the fertility of his imagination and his fine poetic figures, for which even the uncompromising Shams-i Ḋâyân praised him (al-Muḥalli, ed. Tehrân Univ., 360). He also wrote ghazâls, quatrains, satires and obscene verses, in all of which the social conditions of his troubled time are mirrored. A short satirical mathnawi, a Persian letter addressed to an unknown friend, and an Arabic pamphlet dealing with the bow (Risâlat al-Kawâ), are among his other works.

Bibliography: For recent works published in Persia, including the literature of the tadhkirâs, see: A. Khayyâm-Pûr, Forhang-i Sukhravardin-i Iran, Tahrîz 1340 S., 487-8; Kamâl al-Dîn Îsâmîlî’s Kulliyât has been lithographed in Bombay 1307. A new edition of the Dâlîal-i Khâlîq al-Mâlîkâni Abûl-Fadl Kamâl al-Dîn Îsâmîlî’s Isfâhânî has recently been published by H. Bahb-ʿAlîlâmî, Tehrân 1349 S. See also: The hundred love songs of Kamal Ad-Din of Isfahan, tr. by L. Gray and rendered in English verse by Ethen W. Mumford, London 1930. The whole text of the Risâlat al-Kawâ is given in the Maḥalli’ al-Budur of Alî al-Dîn ʿAlî b. ʿAbd Allâh al-Bahâî, 1299, ii, 167-72; H. Ritter, in Philologika, v, no. 20, xi, ascribes to him a maḥmâwî on mystical love which is not to be found in the published divâm. Further references are in: C. Ricu, of Pers. Ms. in the B.M., ii, 80-51; H. Ethen, Neu- persische Litteratur, in Gr.I.Ph., ii, 269; Browne, ii, 540-42; A. J. Arberry, Classical Persian Literature, 1938, 244-8; J. Ryppa, History of Iranian Literature, Dordrecht 1968, 214; idem in the Cambridge History of Iran, v, 585-9.

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KAMANİÇE SEFERİNİN
LOJİSTİK HAZIRLIKLARI

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İmza

Teslim Tarihi:..........................

Sultan Mustafa'nın icludusum biraderzâde'lerinin küçük olmaları ile açıklayan Osmanlı rivâyetine karşı, bazı batılı kaynaklarda iki nokta’ı nazara rastlanmaktadır:

1. Sultan Mustafa’nın tahta çıkarılması, Sultan Ahmed’in vaasiyetinden dolayıdır.


88 Mustafa Nuri Paşa, Netayic el-Vukuat, Istanbul 1327, c. 2, s. 35. 89 Mehmed Zeki Pâkaim, Maktul Şehzâdeler, s. 303. 90 Hammer, Istanbul 1333, c. VIII, s. 198; Ahmed Mumcu, âyet eser, Ankara 1963, s. 199.
That ambassador was Sir Giacomo Soranzo, one of the authors of the letter discussed here. As to his companion, Giovanni Correr, he was elected as bailiff on February 6, 1575. His mission was an extremely delicate and difficult one, his main task being to achieve the keeping of the clauses in the treaty signed two years earlier. The two diplomats probably left for their destination in early summer and were in Doupnitsa on the 7th of July. At least on the second leg of their journey the envoys of the maritime republic quite naturally preferred to travel by land. One should not forget that, after the Battle of Lepanto, the Adriatic was simply teeming with pirates, with Turkish corsairs roaming the south and using the Albanian ports as their hideouts and the north rife with Uskoks — Christian refugees from Dalmatia and Bosnia who continued the resistance against the Turks after the Holy League signed the peace treaty with the Porte. I would like to recall here that, for example, at the end of the 16th century the entire population of Senia made their living by piracy, and that with the blessing of the local Dominican and Franciscan friars. As I have already mentioned, the letter discussed in this article provides indirect information about the land routes on the Balkans, although it rather confirms what we already know about the roads most frequented by merchant curavans and West European envoy missions on their way to Constantinople. M. Soranzo and M. Correr obviously entered Bulgarian territory by the Skopje or Kossowo road which branched from the so-called Toplikov route (Trebina-Foca Novi Pazar-Nis where it joined the main route from Central Europe to Constantinople through Sofia, Plovdiv and Adrianople). The Skopje road branched at Novi Pazar and reached Sofia through the Rizzoza Mountain, Pritina, Skopje, Kumanovo, Kyustendil and Doupnitsa; or joined the road to Constantinople through Smokov, Kostene and Momin Prohod pass. Our travellers arrived in Constantinople on the 22nd of July (according to the first report they dispatched from the chancellery of the bailiff, one that has also been preserved in the Venetian Archives), i.e. the trip from Doupnitsa to Constantinople lasted about 15 days. As one can see from the note on the back, their letter took just as long to arrive in Venice — it was received on the 2nd of July.

Nor is there anything new about the report of the poverty in Bulgarian territories that other travellers of the time have mentioned also. Thus, only three years later, Stephen Gerlach tried to find an explanation of that fact by the assumption that the peasants did not produce more than was necessary for their own needs because they were afraid their harvests would be confiscated. I must say that I consider much more solid the arguments of Augustin Gueslin Bourbeuze who thought that it was mostly the lands near the major roads that were arid and poor for they were subjected to constant raids.

This is what a first reading can glean from the letter addressed by the ambassador to the Council of Venece, although I think that the letter is more important to the hints it provides about the other documents connected with that trip that could be studied. There is no doubt that the whole archival series of the Dispatchi Constantinopoli ("Dispatches from Constantinople") in the Senate fund of the Venetian Archives is well worth a more comprehensive study. The other documents connected with the journey of Giacomo Soranzo and Giovanni Correr to the court of Sultan Murad III are equally interesting, particularly the materials from the Correr Museum in Venice filed under the press-mark of Turciba b. 3/7. These materials should probably be the object of a future study as a potential source of information about the Balkans in the last quarter of the 16th century.

Following a successful military campaign in the autumn of 1572 the Ottomans forced the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to sign the Peace Treaty of Buczacz. According to the provisions of the treaty the entire Podola, together with the fortress of Kamieniec, passed into Turkish hands. Being engaged in the continuance of contumacious attacks the king and the gentry represented by the Great Hetman Jan Sobieski, Rzeczpospolita was caught absolutely unprepared for the war and suffered one of its greatest territorial losses. From the similar losses from the second half of the seventeenth century through to the end of the eighteenth century mark the gradual decline of United Polish — Lithuanian state. After 1627 Kamieniec (today Kamjany, Podol'sk, Ukraine) became the westernmost bastion of the Ottomans in Europe and a centre of a new administrative territorial unit — eyalet. At the border of two ages in Ottoman history — of a continuous territorial growth, followed by a gradual exhaustion of inner resources for expansion, the eyalet of Kamieniec turned into a junction of extreme interests from a strategic, economic and demographic point of view processes.

The news of the fall of Podola in the hands of the Ottomans caused serious anxiety among the neighboring European states. The need for a well-documented study of this period is undeniably determined both by the intricacies of the diplomatic complex which is to be analyzed, and by the fact that political events in the region were of direct concern for the important centres of European politics. Moscow began an intensive preparation for defence of the Ukrainian lands to the east of Drohopper. The conquest of Podola and Kamieniec and the change in the correlation of powers in Southeastern Europe affected the bilateral Russo — Polish relations for decades to come as well as the entire, complex of diplomatic and military actions of the Christian powers towards the end of the century. The events were followed with a heightened attention not only in the Polish Literature but also by the Cossacks of hetman Petar Doroszenko, and the boys in neighbouring Moldavia. The problem of the control over the Danubian area, particularly important for the trading traffic, had never stopped drawing the attention of the Habsburgs as well.

The decades in question are better known in historiographic tradition as the years of the consecutive unsuccessful siege of Vienna, the formation of a powerful anti-Ottoman coalition and the disastrous for the Ottomans Peace Treaty of Karlowitz, and against the backdrop of all these the deeds of the famous Pole Jan Sobieski stand out. The monograph by the young Polish Ottomanist Darucus Kołodziejczyk, Podolya under the Ottoman Rule. The Eyalet of Kamieniec — 1672 — 1699, provides the specialists with a different angle in the analysis of this period, and with a text full of interesting details and ideas at that.
KAMANIÇE SEFERİ VE SEFER GÜZERGÂHI

Mehmet İNBASI

Bu çalışmada, Sultan IV. Mehmet (1648-1687) zamanında Lehistan’ya yapılan ve Kamanıç Seferi olarak da isimlendirilen seferde, ordunun geçmiş olduğu menziller, oturak yerleri ve sefer yolu hakkında bilgi verilmeye çalışılacaktır.

Kaynaklar


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Ottoman Podilia: The Eyalet of Kam’janec’, 1672–1699

DARIUSZ KOŁODZIEJCZYK

In October 1672 the Ottoman dragoman Panaioti congratulated the French ambassador in Istanbul on the fortunate conjunction that provided two great monarchs—Mehmed IV and Louis XIV—with their respective successes in Poland and the Netherlands.1 Thanks to Henryk Sienkiewicz’s novel, Pan Wołodyjowski, the history of the loss of Kam’janec’-Podil’s’kyi (Turkish, Kamanıçe; Polish, Kamieniec Podolski) to the Ottomans has become part of Poland’s popular history. Unfortunately, the later period has been completely neglected and the stereotypes about the “barbarian night” survive even today. And, in spite of Halil Inalcık’s assertions that the Black Sea and Cossack question is basic to the understanding of seventeenth-century Ottoman history,2 very little has been done from the Turkish side to clear up this chapter of Ahmed Köprülü’s3 foreign policy.

To begin with, we should consider the economic, demographic, and political factors that might have had some bearing on the Ottoman decision to attack the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth:

Economy: Contrary to common views, Podilia was not a rich province, at least not during the second half of the seventeenth century. All the rivers in Podilia flowed in the “wrong” direction—toward the Black Sea. Since the fifteenth century the economy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had been tied to the export of cereals and forest products to Western Europe. Michael Postan has estimated that the land transport costs between the Midlands and London may have been higher than the water transport costs between Warsaw and London.4 This cheap transport was possible only because of the great Polish rivers that flowed north. The Italian projects for exporting Ukrainian products through the Black Sea had already failed in

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3 The household of Köprülü had remained in power since 1656. Its founder, Mehmed Köprülü, was succeeded in the post of grand vizier by his son, Fazıl Ahmed (1661–1676), and then by his protégé and son-in-law, Kara Mustafa (1676–1683).
XVII. YÜZYIL SEFER ORGANİZASYONUNDA
SAĞLIK HİZMETLERİNİN SUNUMUNA İLİŞKİN
BİR ARAŞTIRMA (1672 Tarihli Kamanıçe Seferi Örneği)

Mustafa Nuri Türkmen*

Bu konu 1672 tarihli Kamanıçe Seferi göz önünde alılarak hazırlanmıştır. Bildiriyi sunmakta-
ki amaçımız, Osmanlı ordusunda sefer esnasında sağlık hizmetlerinin ne şekilde sunulduğu ve
kadar kadrolarının hangi sınıflardan oluştuğu, sağlık konusunun bu yöntemler ve bunların hangi yollarla finanse edildiği gibi sorulara cevap
bulmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu sorulara cevap olmak üzere elimizdeki Kamanıçe Seferi muhasebe defter-
lerindeki tayinat listeleri ve verilerden harekete bazı neticelerle ulaşmaya çalıştık. Özellikle veri
tabanımızı Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri, Maliyeden Müdever Deftserler serisinin 1970 numaralı
mufassal muhasebe defterinin kayıtları oluşturmuştur.

Osmanlı Ordusu sefere çıktığında banyosunun sadece askeri birimleri veya askeri idareler
kadarınca barındırması. Aynı zamanda devlet yönetimini yürüten asker veya sivil karakterli bütün
devlet memurları da orduyla beraber hareket ederdir. Merkezde onların boşaaltımları makamla
vekilleri atandır. Dolayısıyla sefer hali bir nevi devlet teşkilatının araziye çökmiş teşkilatdır. Böyle
olunca normal zamanda, sağlık hizmetleri kimi sorumluluk ve denetimi altında ise seferde de
onun denetimi altında olacaktır.

Belgelerde genellikle "Ser Etişba-i Hâssa" ismiyle anılan Hekimbashi; ilmiyat sınıflarını mensup
olup, sarayın bir ricalinden sayıldı. Özellikle padişahın hasta olmamasına dikkat ederek bir
anlama koruyucu hekimlik görevini yürütür, yemeklerde dahi yanandan ayrılmaz, her nereye gitse
yanda bulunurdu. Aynı zamanda padişaha sağlık konularda danışmanlık yapar, ilaçların dışında
onlara kuvvet verici, istah açıcı çeşitli şuuplar hazırlardı.

Ulufeleri aylık olarak almanın yanında kendilerine Tekfurdağı arpalığı verilirdi. Zaman
zaman ilâve olarak Aydın ve Gelibolu arpalıkları da eklenirdi. Sefere katkıda ise menzil tayinatı
alırdı.

Hekimbashi ülkedeki tüm hekimlerin, Ser Cerrahî başlı cerrahların ve Ser Kehâle başlı
kehrhallerin (göz doktoru) sorumluluğunu taşımaktaydı. Dolayısıyla orduyda sağlık hizmetlerinin
baş sorumlusu adından da anlasılacağı gibi Hekimbaşydi. Ordu tabiplerinin belirlenmesi, askeri
teşkilat için gerekli hammadde almı, ilaç yapımı ve gerekli yerlere dağıtımanın en yetkili kişişiydii.

Konumuz olan 1672 tarihli Kamanıçe Seferinde Hekimbasi'nin Hayatı'na Mustafa Fevzi
Efendi olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bu seferde dair düzenlenmiş defterlerde Ser Etişba-i Hâssa olarak
Mustafa Efendi'nin adı geçmektedir. Kendisine 26 kişiilik yardımcı grup eşlik etmektedirdi. Yine aynı
kayıtlardan hizmetleriyle birlikte ekme, hayvanları için ise arpa tayinatı verildiği anlaşılmaktadır.

Kapakulu'nun yanı Yeniçeri, Cebeci, Topçu, Toparabalı, Humbaracı ve Altı Bölük halkı denilen
oçakların her sınıfinin kendi hekimleri ve onların da başında bir baş hekim vardı. Bu tabipler defter-
lerde "Etişba-i hassa gayet-i ez Ser etişb" , yani Hekimbashi haricinde hâssa tabipler şekilde
gömektedir. Eldeki verilerden sayılanların 18 olduğu anlaşılmıştır. XVII. yüzyılın ortalarında Etiş-
ba-i hassa 14 Müslüman ve 4 Yahudi olmak üzere 18 kişidir ki bizim verilerimizle paralellik arz

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In October 1672 the Ottoman dragoman Panaitoi congratulated the French ambassador in Istanbul on the fortunate conjuction that provided two great monarchs - Mehmed IV and Louis XIV - with their respective successes in Poland and in the Netherlands.\(^1\) Thanks to the novel written by Henryk Si- enkiewicz (also author of *Quo vadis*), the history of the loss of Kam’janec’ (Pol. Kamieniec Podolski) is well known to every Polish child. Unfortunately the later period was completely neglected and the stereotypes about the "barbarian night" survived until today. The multiethnic and multireligious province of Podolia was the only part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to fall under the direct rule of the Porte. It must be said that after 20 years of wars and recent partition of the Ukraine between Poland and Russia in 1667 many Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants greeted the Ottomans with hope. This is confirmed in the Ottoman chronicles of Haci Ali and Silahdar, and in Polish sources as well.\(^2\) The traditional Ottoman policy of supporting the Orthodox Ukrainian peasants against Polish Catholic nobles and the so-called *millet* policy towards Armenian and Jewish merchants had the result that only the Polish Catholic community could be considered as totally opposed to the new rulers.

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Koruyucu Zâde Fâdûd yakında elette çıkmadık

Veled Celebi

Komanîse

Ýnârî, 1926

s. 111-118, İstanbul

Tûrk Yurdû, c. IV, sayı: 20, Ağustos-1926

09 Ekim 1993

Tûrk Yurdû, c. IV, sayı: 20, Ağustos-1926

s. 111-118, İstanbul
Kamaniçe

Kamaniçe (in Ottoman orthography, Qamāniče; Ukr. Kam’yanets’ Podil’s’kij; Pol. Kamieniec Podolski) is a town in the Podolia region of present-day Ukraine, which traces its origins to a medieval Ruthenian fort that was conquered by the Mongols in the mid-thirteenth century. After the internal crisis in the Golden Horde in the mid-1300s, it became the centre of a principality ruled by a Lithuanian dynasty and a bone of contention between Lithuania and Poland. From the fourteenth century, the town was a major commercial centre, inhabited by Ruthenians, Poles, Armenians, and other ethno-religious groups. Its Kipchak-speaking Armenian populace maintained regular contact with Armenian diasporas in the Middle East.

The town was incorporated into the Polish realm in 1430 and became the centre of the palatinate of Podolia. It was the largest fortress on Poland’s southeastern frontier and was considered the main bulwark against the Tatars and Ottoman Turks. The Popes repeatedly authorized the Polish kings to use the “Peter’s-pence” (medieval dues paid to the Papacy) to maintain Kamieniec’s defences. Besides its strong fortifications, the town’s very location—on a bluff above the deep gorge of the Smotry River—discouraged potential invaders. Further defences were added in the early seventeenth century, including the so-called New Castle. In 1643/1633, Abaza Mehmed (Abaza Mehmed) Paşa (d. 1644/1634), the Ottoman governor of Özü (Očaków), advanced on Kamieniec but did not attack it. The Porte dissociated itself from this incident, and Abaza Mehmed was later executed.

Developments in military art rendered the town’s fortifications obsolete by the second half of the seventeenth century, and in 1683/1672, forces of the Ottoman army headed by Sultan Mehmed (Mehem) IV (r. 1688–99/1648–87), which were commanded by Grand Vizier Ahmed (Ahmed) Köprülü (d. 1087/1676), captured Kamieniec easily. With the Treaty of Buczac (Ukr. Bučač, 1083/1672), the town, now called Kamaniçe, became the centre of a new Ottoman eyalet (eyalet, province) and the seat of a beylerbeysi (beylerbeği, governor). The Ottomans converted several churches into mosques,