

Nūrī Sa'īd Pasa
 Sa'īd, 'Ismat.

(Nūrī al-Sa'īd, rajul al-dawlah
 wa-al-insān)

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Abstract: This dissertation is a study of Iraq's role in inter-Arab relations, 1941-1958. Special attention was given to the dominant figure on the Iraqi political scene, Nuri as-Said.

The topics of this study are covered in five chapters. In the first I discuss Iraq's role and attitudes towards Arab independence and liberation movements. This chapter points out Iraq's diplomatic efforts in support of the independence of both Syria and Lebanon. Iraq's position in regard to Egypt's attempts to assert its national sovereignty by abrogating the 1936 treaty with Britain and the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 are also discussed.

Iraq's attitudes towards the Arab League are analyzed next. Iraq's diplomatic efforts were to secure itself a prominent position in this Arab organization. Another section covers Iraq's official policy towards the League. Such a policy experienced three phases: cooperation, dispute, then neglect or indifference. The last section discusses Iraq's participation in Arab League activities.

The third chapter treats Iraq and the issues of Arab unity and union. First, the Iraqi-Jordanian union projects are covered. The second section treats Iraqi-Syrian projects. The first phase, 1943-1949, was called the Fertile Crescent era. The second phase, 1949-1958, was called the period of Iraqi-Syrian Union. Arab and international circumstances prevented attempts at unity in both periods from materializing.

Chapters four and five are dedicated to Iraq's attitude towards the Palestinian problem; its role in the 1948 war; its attitude towards Jordan's annexation of the West Bank; and finally, Iraq's role in the attempts to solve the Palestinian problem.

The primary sources used in this study are the minutes of the military court trials of the old Iraqi regime's politicians which were held following the revolution of July 14, 1958. Another important source was the minutes of the Iraqi Parliament sessions from 1943 to 1958. Their significance was in detecting the voices of both the Iraqi government and its opposition and critics.

Nuri al-Sa'id's Arab Unity Programme

Yehoshua Porath

IRAQ'S INTERESTS IN FERTILE CRESCENT UNITY

From its inception the new Iraqi state was, on the one hand, apprehensive of most of its neighbours and, on the other, bound to the Arab world and the Mediterranean through Syria. Persia, since the establishment at the end of fifteenth century of the strong Safawi-Shiite dynasty, had been a persistent enemy of the Ottoman Empire, which conquered Iraq from the Safawis in 1534. Thereafter the boundary between these two empires along the Shatt al-Arab river had been a permanent bone of contention. Usually when the Ottomans were engaged in a war on their western or northern frontiers the Persians would use the opportunity to encroach upon Ottoman dominions in Iraq, until the latter power was strong enough to regain control of what had been lost to the Persians. The fact that the Shiite Holy Places of al-Najaf, Karbala and al-Kazimayn were located in Iraq under Ottoman Sunni rule formed a steady source of friction.

This basic situation hardly altered with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. From a Persian point of view, as far as the boundary and the holy places were concerned nothing changed, with the substitution of Ottoman Sunni rule by an Arab-Hashemite Iraqi rule which was also Sunni.¹ From an Iraqi angle if there was a change it was for the worse. Persian pilgrims continued to visit their holy places, but now the government controlling these holy places was much weaker than that of the Ottoman Sultan. The new Iraqi monarch was afraid lest the more rigorous Pahlevi ruler exploit the existence of the holy places and the rights of the pilgrims to press various political demands upon Iraq. Iraq stuck to the provisions of the old Ottoman-Persian treaty which had conferred upon the Ottoman full rights of sovereignty over both banks of the Shatt al-Arab, and brought the matter before the League of Nations.²

Iraqi Shiites looked towards Persia (Iran since 1935) for guidance, inspiration and protection. Some Shiites, including school teachers, regarded themselves as Persians. Sometimes they expressed loyalty to Persia or propagated the idea of Persia taking over the Iraqi Mandate from Britain. Such manifestations of attachment to Persia only increased the suspicions of the Iraqi authorities towards its Shiite population, some of whom were Persian nationals or of Persian descent.³

Shiism was not the only Iranian factor which threatened Iraq. The new Pahlevi Shah, after having consolidated his position, adopted a more rigorous kind of nationalism and revived dreams of resurrecting the old Sassanian Empire. Iranian children were taught in schools to regard Ctesiphon in Iraq as the rightful capital of the Persian King of Kings. All these aggravated Iraq's apprehensions and misgivings as far as her eastern neighbour was concerned.⁴

The British were aware of this situation and had no qualms in using it in their dealings with the Iraqi authorities, reminding the Iraqis of the dangers that they were confronting over their eastern frontier and their need for secure British support.⁵ It should be added that even after a treaty had been signed in 1937 between Iran and Iraq the latter's fears did not disappear.

Similar fears governed Iraq's attitude towards another of its neighbours – Turkey. The latter had up to 1926 endeavoured to secure the oil-rich northern district of Iraq for itself. She did not hesitate to encourage by clandestine means the Turkish population of that district to demand its annexation to Turkey.⁶ Only a very strong British position and the latter's paramount influence in the League of Nations convinced Turkey to give up its claim to the district of Mosul and to accept the existing boundary as final. However, the 1926 settlement of the Mosul question did not altogether alleviate Iraq's apprehensions. Iraq's political élite had grown up during the Ottoman period and could not forget that Iraq had once been governed from Istanbul. Some of them could not believe that the Turks had given up for good all desire to regain the Ottoman lost territories in Iraq and especially Mosul. This was particularly so since northern Iraq contained many non-Arab inhabitants (Kurds, Turkomans and Turks) whose kith and kin lived beyond the Turkish border and, according to official Turkish nationalist ideology, the Kurds were but 'mountainous Turks' to say nothing of ethnic Turks and Turkish-speaking Turkomans.⁷

Even later on, years after the question of the district of Mosul had been settled in Iraq's favour, the Kurdish concentration in that district continued to worry the Iraqis. Their governing circles were not confident enough that they could forestal a Kurdish demand for autonomy or even independence, the more so since such demands might be supported and even encouraged by the Soviet Union. Iraq felt that it needed the support of the Arabs in order to prevent such an eventuality from taking place.⁸

Less strong but still important was Iraq's unease about its relations with its southern neighbour, the Saudi monarchy, which succeeded in 1926 in expelling the Hashemite dynasty and uniting the Hijaz with Najd into the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. The presence of Hashemite fugitives in Faysal's court in Baghdad was a permanent reminder of his father's ignominious fate. Furthermore, there was border tension arising from the complicated questions of tribes wandering across the Iraq-Saudi border.⁹

All these factors drove Iraq to look for a wider framework in which she might feel more secure. This framework was the Fertile Crescent and specifically Syria. With the Arabs of Syria the Kurdish threat might look less threatening. One has also to remember that the Arab Sunnis, from whom the élite which ruled Iraq was drawn, did not exceed about 25 per cent of the population. Only with the Sunni Kurds did they constitute a match for the Shiites, who numbered more than 50 per cent. Therefore it may be rather reasonable to assume that Iraq's search for Sunni Arab partners stemmed also from this consideration.

The Iraqis also felt that Syria was the land which connected them with the wider Arab world and through which passed the lines of communication with the Mediterranean.¹⁰ The development of the oil industry and the comple-

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Elizabeth MONROE

BRITAIN'S MOMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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(ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL)

NŪRĪ, SHAYKH FADL ALLĀH, the most notable of the anti-constitutionalist ʿulamāʾ in the Persian Revolution of 1906.

Ḥādīdī Shaykh Faḍl Allāh Nūrī was born in Tehran in 1259/1843-4 and went at an early age to study in the ʿAtabāt [q.v. in Suppl.] under his uncle Mirzā Muḥammad Husayn Nūrī, and under Mirzā Ḥasan Shīrāzī (M. Turkamān, *Shaykh-i shahīd Faḍl Allāh Nūrī*, Tehran 1362 Sh/1983, i, 9). In about 1300/1883 he returned to Tehran, where he gradually emerged as the leading scholar and jurist. He was active in the movement against the Tobacco Concession in 1308-9/1890-1, but otherwise not particularly prominent politically until 1321/1903, when ʿAyn al-Dawla was appointed Ṣadr-i Aʿzam and passed on to Shaykh Faḍl Allāh the responsibility for government business in the *shariʿa* courts, which had previously come under the *muḥtāhid* Sayyid ʿAbd Allāh Bihbihāni (Mirzā Muḥammad Nāzim al-Islām Kirmāni, *Tārīkh-i bidārī-yi Irāniyān*, Tehran 1361 Sh/1982, i, 210). Shaykh Faḍl Allāh supported ʿAyn al-Dawla's reforms of the finances in an attempt to preserve the traditional system of government and authority, but when the Ṣadr-i Aʿzam's régime collapsed in Djumādā II 1324/July 1906, Shaykh Faḍl Allāh was forced to join what became the constitutional movement, although he had previously expressed doubts about constitutionalism (Nāzim al-Islām, *Bidārī*, i, 321-4).

He found himself in eclipse, however, until the accession of Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāh [q.v.] in Dhū l-Kaʿda 1324/January 1907 gave him a powerful new ally. Having failed in discussion to modify the radical measures of the proposed Supplementary Fundamental Law he took *bast* [q.v.] or sanctuary in the Shrine of Shāh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm from 9 Djumādā II to 8 Shaʿbān 1325/20 June to 16 September 1907, almost certainly financed by the Shah (Spring Rice to Grey, no. 143, 10 July 1907, FO 416/34 no. 136; Y. Dawlatābādī, *Tārīkh-i muʿāsir yā hayāt-i Yahyā*, ii, Tehran 1337 Sh/1958, 129). From there he published a series of propaganda leaflets in which he argued for *mashrūʿiyyat* or, more specifically *niẓām-nāma-yi islāmī*, an Islamic constitution (for the leaflets, see Turkamān, *Shahīd*, i, 231-368; H. Ridwānī, *Lawāyih-i Ākā Shaykh Faḍl Allāh Nūrī*, Tehran 1362 Sh/1983). He also maintained that constitutionalism was contrary to the *shariʿa*, most notably on the point of equality before the law (Turkamān, *Shahīd*, 287-8, 291-2). Following the fear and disarray induced in the court at the assassination of the then prime minister Amīn al-Sulṭān, the Shah appears to have withdrawn his support and Shaykh Faḍl Allāh emerged from *bast*. He participated in the royalist demonstrations of Dhū l-Kaʿda 1325/December 1907 but did not return to prominence until after the coup of Djumādā I 1326/June 1908. Then in a *fatwā* (M. Malikzāda, *Tārīkh-i imkilāb-i mashrūʿiyyat-i Irān*, Tehran 1351 Sh/

1972, iv, 211-21) and in a work entitled *Tadhkirat al-shāhīd wa-irshād al-djāhil* (Turkamān, *Shahīd*, i, 56-75), he provided the Shah with a legitimising ideology for his refusal to restore the Shah with a legitimising ideology for his refusal to restore the *maǧlis*, arguing most notably that the Shah was one of the two pillars of Islam together with the ʿulamāʾ, his role being to maintain order and stability (Malikzāda, *Mashrūʿiyyat*, iv, 217). He further contended that constitutionalism was pernicious, since it contradicted the five Muslim precepts (*al-ahkām al-khamsa*), implying that it interfered with the soteriological purpose of Islam (V.A. Martin, *Islam and modernism: the Iranian Revolution of 1906*, London 1989, 178-9). In addition, he attacked the constitutionalists' source of legitimacy in representation of the will of the people, arguing that it had no basis for any claim to authority in Imāmi Shīʿī law (Malikzāda, *Mashrūʿiyyat*, IV, 211; Turkamān, *Shahīd*, i, 67, 89-90; Martin, *op. cit.*, 181-3).

After the abdication of Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāh in Rajab 1327/July 1909, Shaykh Faḍl Allāh declined the chance of refuge in the Russian Legation along with the Shah and his other prominent supporters (Malikzāda, *Mashrūʿiyyat*, v, 265, vi, 117). He was arrested, tried on 13 Rajab 1327/31 July 1909 and publicly executed immediately afterwards. On the scaffold he is said to have recited the verse, "If we were a heavy burden, we are gone; if we were unkind, we are gone" (E.G. Browne, *The Persian revolution 1905-9*, Cambridge 1910, 444; see also Nāzim al-Islām, *Bidārī*, ii, 535).

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(VANESSA MARTIN)

NURI KILLIGIL [see ENWER PASHA].

NŪRĪ AL-SAʿĪD, fourteen times Prime Minister of ʿIrāk under the monarchy (1921-58) and one of the most robust Arab politicians of his generation, was born in Baghdād in 1888, the son of a minor administrative official, and was killed at the hands of a hostile crowd in Baghdād on the day after the ʿIrāk Revolution of 14 July 1958. Nūrī attended military schools in Baghdād and Istanbul, receiving his commission in 1906; after four years soldiering in ʿIrāk, he returned to the Staff College in Istanbul, participating in campaigns in Macedonia (1911) and in the Balkan Wars (1912-13). In common with many of his fellow Arab officers, he was attracted to the liberal aims of the Committee of Union and Progress [see İTTIHĀD VE TERAKKĪ DJEMʿİYETİ], only to be disappointed by the increasingly centralising and pro-Turkish policies which it pursued when in power. Along with several other ʿIrākīs, Nūrī joined *al-ʿAbd*, a secret society of Arab officers in the Ottoman Army, founded by ʿAziz ʿAlī al-Miṣrī.

At the outbreak of the First World War, Nūrī was in Baṣra where he surrendered to the British occupying forces. He was sent briefly to India and eventually made contact with ʿAziz ʿAlī al-Miṣrī, whom he joined in Cairo at the end of 1915. Shortly afterwards he was asked to take part in the British-sponsored Arab

فيهما معالم فنه: القسم الأول بلغ أوجه في أواخر الثلاثينات متمثلاً على الأخص في «ذات الجدائل الذهبية» و«القط الأبيض» و«جماليات بحري» و«المنزهة»، وهي مرحلة امتازت بطغيان «الأنثى» أو بالأحرى «الجوهر الأنثوي» الذي يذكر بالأنوثة الطاغية للمرأة الأسطورة في الهند، أو في القصص الشعبي العربي، فهي «ست الحسن والدلال» تارة، وتلك التي تنصب فخاخها لتنقض على ضحيتها تارة أخرى، وقد بلغ هذا الرمز من القوة حد اقتران اسم محمود سعيد في الأذهان بصورة «بنت بحري»، مما حمل بعض النقاد على إغفال التطور العام الذي طرأ على فنه وعلى رؤاه في القسم الثاني من إنتاجه الذي بلغ أوجه في الخمسينات وامتاز بسيادة المنظر الطبيعي، ولا سيما «مناظر الجبال» في كل من لبنان ومناطق البحر الأحمر، فسطع نور هذي المناظر وشع بعد انحسار، وامتدت آفاقها أمام المتلقي بعد انغلاق.

فنان السبامي

الأوربي أسلوب التصوير الثلاثي الأبعاد بما يتضمنه من ظلال وأنوار ودرجات ألوان، وأخذ أيضاً القواعد الأساسية في هندسة اللوحة فاستخدمها استخداماً خاصاً على تحويلاً بهندساً الضن الضرعوني أو السومري. لم يكن تحوير الأشكال في فن محمود سعيد غاية في ذاته، بل وسيلة تحبب تصميم اللوحة وربط أجزاءها في كل متسق ومنسجم، وكان في أحيان قليلة يلجأ إلى التصميم الدائري كما في لوحة «الصيد العجيب» أو «الذكر»، وكان المضمون عنده لا يعني مجرد «علاقات شكلية» وإنما هو مزيج شبه كيميائي بين هذه العلاقات وبين «الأشياء» أو «المخلوقات» الممثلة في العمل الفني، وهذا ما يؤكد أن المفهوم الزخرفي للفن وبمعناه الرفيع هو الذي كان يشغل وعي الفنان ويثير اهتمامه.

يبقى من إنتاج محمود سعيد الوافر والغزير، إذا ما استثنيت مرحلة العشرينات الأولى، قسماً تبلورت

بالبناء والتكوين، وقدم من خلال لوحات «الموضوع» أعمالاً جمعت محاور ثلاثة يتمثل فيها المضمون الرمزي لفنه: خصوصية الجنس، والإحساس بفكرة الموت، وإبراز المحتوى الرمزي لمعنى العبادة والعمل. فالمرأة عنده رمز للخصب، جاءت في لوحاته بعد صوم عن المرثيات، فأخرج المرأة من وراء التوريات الزخرفية صريحة مجردة. أما الإحساس بفكرة الموت، فيتمثل في لوحاته التي عالج فيها موضوع المقابر والدفن. وأما صور العبادة والعمل فتلوح فيها رمزية غامضة من خلال وشائج تشكيلية متينة تجلت في اللوحات: «الصلاة» و«الذكر» و«المدينة» و«الصيد» و«الشواذيف».

إن أعرب ما في أسلوب محمود سعيد أنه لم يتعمده عمداً، لأن طبيعته غلبت عليه، لقد نبذ الجمال الإغريقي المثالي والحركة العضلية بمفهومها الكلاسيكي، وانصرف عن جميع التيارات الفنية بما فيها الانطباعية التي تأثر بها في بداياته، ولكنه، في الوقت نفسه، أخذ من تراث الفن

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■ السعيد (نوري -)

(١٨٨٨ - ١٩٥٨)

إلى بومباي ثم إلى القاهرة، وهناك التقى الزعيم سعد زغلول وعزيز علي المصري واقتنع بضرورة العمل لتخليص العرب من الحكم العثماني. استدعاه الشريف حسين بن علي سنة ١٩١٦م، فوصل إلى جدة على متن باخرة بريطانية تحمل أربعة آلاف

وتخرج فيها سنة ١٩٠٦، برتبة ملازم. وفي سنة ١٩١١ التحق بكلية الأركان وتخرج فيها بعد عامين، وشارك في حرب البلقان (١٩١٢ - ١٩١٣). في سنة ١٩١٤ عاد إلى البصرة وانتسب إلى جمعية العهد، فانتقله الإنكليز حين احتلوا البصرة، فنقلوه

نوري بن سعيد بن صالح بن الملاطة، ولد في بغداد وهو من عشيرة القره غولي البغدادية. كان والده موظفاً في الإدارة التركية في العراق، وبعد أن تلقى العلوم الأولية أدخل المدرسة العسكرية في بغداد، ثم سافر إلى اصطنبول ودخل الكلية العسكرية