

We stop here in the 1890s because patriotism gave way to vernacular mass nationalism against the British, as well as to new ideologies, such as socialism, exemplified by revolutionary plays about social injustice. Muṣṭafā Kāmil died prematurely, and the khedivate's last decade saw the crystallization of a new political force and vision, often independent of the khedive: territorial nationalism demanding the end of occupation, limitation of absolute power (new constitutionalism), and increasing reluctance to return to the Ottomans. In 1914, the British government abolished the khedivate and established a direct British Protectorate over Egypt. A new political pact had to be made.

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*Adam Westyan, Arab Patriotism: The Ideology and Culture of Power in
Late Ottoman Egypt, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017.*

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CONCLUSION

The Ottoman Origin of Arab Nationalisms

This book has reflected on the problem of what the Ottoman context of Egypt means for its nationalism. What were the consequences of the imperial embedding for a well-established national narrative? The revision made it necessary, first, to theorize an Ottoman network of Arab imagined communities, second, to reflect on the special place of Egypt within these communities due to its specific geography and power structure (the khedivate), and, lastly, to bring Islam back into the discursive formation of national identity. A network-based theory of Arab patriotism seemed to encompass all these three points, and it also served to reject the application of the distinct Western categories of the “religious,” “territorial,” and “ethnic/linguistic” in the Ottoman nineteenth century.

The empire was mediated by the khedives in the Egyptian province. The khedivate's main feature was that its governors had no dependence on the imperial infrastructure in order to rule. They married in the imperial elite but established their own Ottoman-Egyptian subsystem. The findings of this book have suggested that selected local groups were ready to make a compromise with them. Intellectuals, though with opposing ideas, attempted to make Arab patriotism the ideology of the khedivate. The Ottoman Empire meanwhile served as a guarantee for all parties involved, since there remained a mutual distrust. The main consequence of telling the story of Egypt through its Ottoman attachment is the articulation of the non-European, local power structure before and even during direct European rule. While this local-imperial system used amply European techniques and technologies the attribution of change to colonial (i.e., European) agency, reducing the khedives and their men to puppets, or identifying emerging new subjectivities as only semi- or fully colonial ones, are ahistorical and inaccurate. It leads to false conclusions concerning the nature of power in post-Ottoman Egypt and the Arab world, even today.

The same criticism that Elie Kedourie directed against Albert Hourani's *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age* can be applied against my study. Kedourie argued in the 1960s that there was a difference between public and private views in khedivial Egypt. He hinted that the difference was

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