

21 Kasım 2017

1263 HECK, Paul L. *Skepticism in classical Islam: moments of confusion*. London & New York: Routledge, 2014. 215 pp. Explores the critical role of skeptical thinking in the development of theology in Islam.

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MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

مآخذ روایت را ذکر کرده است. طبرسی کتاب خود را در ده باب و هر باب را در فصل‌های متعددی تنظیم کرده است. این کتاب، یک بار در نجف در سال ۱۳۷۰ق به چاپ رسیده و به تازگی با تحقیق مهدی هوشمند چاپ جدید شده است.

منابع: الدرر، ۵۴/۲۱. محسن دریایی

مشکات المصابیح (محمد مؤمن) ← تفسیر و تفاسیر شیعه

مشکک، از مباحث کهن علم منطق که در فلسفه، کلام، فقه، اخلاق و اصول فقه کاربردهایی دارد. در لغت، اسم فاعل است به معنای در شک اندازنده. برخی آن را اسم مفعول یعنی مشکک می‌دانند که با توجه به معنای اصطلاحی و وجه تسمیه آن دقیق به نظر نمی‌رسد. منطقیون مفاهیم کلی را از نظر چگونگی صدق بر مصادیقش به دو دسته متواطی و مشکک تقسیم می‌کنند. مشکک به کلی‌ای گفته می‌شود که دلالت آن بر افراد و مصادیقش به طور یکسان نیست، بلکه معنای آن در برخی مصادیق، شدیدتر و در برخی ضعیف‌تر است، مانند نور که به معنای کلی حمل می‌شود، از نور شمع تا نور خورشید. در مفهوم مشکک، بدون قرینه نمی‌توان فهمید کدام مرتبه و چه نحوه‌ای از این مفاهیم مراد است. به همین سبب، برخی در وجه تسمیه مشکک گفته‌اند که انسان را به شک می‌اندازد که آیا این مفهوم از نوع مشترک لفظی است یا مشترک معنوی، زیرا افراد از یک جهت در آن مشترک‌اند و از جهت دیگر مختلف‌اند.

اگرچه می‌توان در آثار ارسطو پیشینه الفاظ مشکک را پی گرفت، اما ابونصر فارابی (م ۳۳۹ق) نخستین بیان منطقی با عنوان «الفاظ مشکک» را در آثارش ارائه کرده است. الفاظ مشکک در آغاز قسیم مشترک لفظی شمرده می‌شدند اما در فرآیند زمانی این مفهوم ذیل تقسیم‌بندی اسم دارای یک معنی به جزئی و کلی قرار گرفت. ویژگی‌های مشکک را این چنین می‌توان برشمرد: (۱) وصف مفهوم کلی است؛ (۲) افراد در صدق مفهوم کلی بر آنها مختلف‌اند؛ (۳) در مقابل مفهوم متواطی قرار می‌گیرد. توطای به معنای توافق است و صدق مفاهیم آن بر همه افرادش یکنواخت است، همانند «جسم» که بر همه مصادیقش به طور یکسان اطلاق می‌شود؛ (۴) به سه قسم عامی، خاصی و اخصی تقسیم می‌شود. در تشکیک

بودند و اگر خراسان جز حاج میرزا حبیب‌الله شهیدی دانشمند دیگری نداشتی او را بس بودی. این تاریخچه متعلق به ده سال، یعنی از ۱۳۱۴ هجری قمری تا ۱۳۲۴ بوده که در ایران عصر جدیدی افتتاح شد و افکار نو در همه طبقات پدید آمد و من نیز بی‌بهره نماندم و به فراگرفتن زبان فرانسه، علوم طبیعی و ادب اروپایی مشغول شدم و دو مسافرت به خارج کردم. در یک سفر، نزدیک به یک سال در قاهره توقف کردم. در سفر دیگر سه سال در پاریس ماندم و در این سفر بسیار جاها را دیدم و بسیاری از بزرگان ملت‌های گوناگون را ملاقات کردم و در اواخر جنگ بین‌الملل اول بود که به ایران بازگشتم و به خدمت معارف پذیرفته شدم و بعد به دادگستری منتقل شدم. پس از بازگشت به وطن، در مشهد اقامت گزید و، ضمن خدمت در فرهنگ و تدریس فلسفه و ادبیات، مجله علمی و ادبی دبستان را در آن شهر تاسیس کرد. این مجله، یکی از مجلات بسیار نفیس به زبان فارسی به‌شمار می‌رفت. از آثار او، گذشته از مجله دبستان، تقویم هزاروپانصد ساله در تطبیق سال‌های قمری با شمسی است که چاپ نشده است. زندگینامه خودنوشت او به درخواست احمد گلچین معانی برای درج در گلزار معانی نیز در دست هست. وی مقدمه‌ای در احوال آثار ابوعلی سینا بر ترجمه اشارات (قسمت طبیعیات و الهیات) نوشته است و نیز مقدمه‌ای بر دیوان قصاید میرزا جعفر ریاض همدانی، شاعر و ریاضی‌دان دوره قاجار.

منابع: گلزار معانی، در ارمغان، س ۲۴، ش ۱-۲ (۱۳۲۷).

شهرام تقی‌زاده انصاری

MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

مشکات الانوار فی غرر الأخبار، مجموعه‌ای روایی اثر فضل‌بن حسن طبرسی (م حدود ۶۰۰) در اخلاق و آداب. مؤلف که خود نواده علامه طبرسی مفسر مشهور شیعی است، این کتاب را در تکمیل کتاب شریف مکارم الاخلاق پدر خود نگاشته است. یکی از دلایل اهمیت این کتاب که از مصادر بحار الأنوار علامه مجلسی و مستدرک الوسائل محدث نوری محسوب می‌شود نقل اخبار فراوانی از کتاب المحاسن برقی است. مؤلف برای طولانی نشدن روایات و تأثیرگذاری هرچه بیشتر آنها سلسله اسناد را حذف و تنها نام آخرین راوی را ذکر کرده است. البته در ابتدای هر دسته از روایات منابع و

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KELAM - FELSEFE

• Şüphelilik

VAN ESS, J. Skepticism in Islamic religious thought. *God and man in contemporary Islamic thought*. Ed. by Charles Malik, Beirut, 1972, pp. 83-98.

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Skepticism

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Abstract

Every inquiry into skepticism in the Middle Ages aims at seeking the missing link that would allow the understanding of how we changed from the ancient conception of skepticism as a way of life (living without belief) to a modern conception of skepticism as the general critique of knowledge. The medieval reception of the ancient mode of skepticism and the transformations they made after its reception allow us to understand this evolution. Thus, the Middle Ages occupy a nodal place in the history of skepticism.

Strictly speaking, there is no skeptical school in the Middle Ages insofar as no one, except John of Salisbury, explicitly claimed to be a skeptic. Medieval epistemology on the other hand accords a place of growing importance to the question of skepticism, ultimately finding incontrovertible the examination and refutation of skeptical arguments. In a way, skepticism in the Middle Ages is primarily a construction lacking a historical foundation; a set of

arguments against the possibility of knowledge and a test for all theories of knowledge. Nonetheless, the consideration of these arguments, conjoined with the development of a set of theories of knowledge attuned to the fallibility of human reason and to the problem of induction drove, at the end of the Middle Ages, some philosophers to develop theories of knowledge that produce skeptical effects, limiting the hold of our capacity for knowledge (e.g., Nicolas of Autrecourt, William Crathorn, Robert Holcot). It is in this sense that we can speak of a medieval form of skepticism proper in the fourteenth century.

In order to understand how the medieval skeptical vision was elaborated, we must examine the medieval reception of ancient skepticism. If Sextus Empiricus' *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* was available in Latin near the end of the Middle Ages, it is not possible to tell today if the text had any readers. In the same fashion, Cicero, whose texts were more widely circulated, could have influenced John of Salisbury (who does not seem to know of the *Academics*, however) and Henry of Gent, but his real influence remains quite minimal. Indeed, the construction of the image of skepticism as that which denies the possibility of knowledge stems from the conjunction of the Augustinian influence and the rediscovery of Pre-Socratic (Democritus, Protagoras, Heraclitus) arguments via Aristotle. Presenting neo-Academic doctrines in a synthetic manner in *Against the Academicians* II, 11, Augustine shows what we can call the logical structure of skepticism. The point of departure and the crux of the Academic position is that nothing can be known. Augustine draws the conclusion, typically skeptical according to him: the sage must suspend assent. This suspension of assent would be taken as a general doubt in the Middle Ages. Augustine thus emphasizes the fundamental status of the thesis according to which nothing can be known (that is to say an object of *scientia*, or to be known with certainty). This thesis is proved by the Academics by showing that it is impossible to find a perception that is an evident criterion of truth. Augustine goes on to elaborate a typology of skeptical arguments: (1) disagreement among people (i.e., relativity of knowledge); (2) the fallibility of the senses; (3) dreams and madness, and, finally; (4) paralogisms and sophisms. (1) permits the emphasis that there are no evident and universal criteria for truth, (2) and (3) that the sources of knowledge are not reliable, and (4) that error is found just as much at the level of reasoning as it is in the testimony of the senses. This thus frames the portrait of skepticism as that which denies the possibility of knowledge due to the impossibility of distinguishing truth from falsity since uncertainty is found just as much in objects as it is in the knower. The model of skepticism inherited in the Middle

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Şüphecilik

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HELENİSTİK ROMA FELSEFESİ:
SEPTİKLER (ŞÜPHECİLER)

Osman Elmalı* - Ömer Özden**

(182029) Şüphelilik
21 Temmuz 2015

MADDE YAYIMLANDIKTAN
SONRA GELEN DOKÜMAN

büyük İskender'in Doğu seferiyle birlikte buradaki düşüncelerin ve hatta dinî öğelerin de tanınmasıyla birlikte Antik felsefe yeni bir yola girmeye başladı. Artık teorik problemlerden çok pratik problemler tartışılır oldu. Bu dönemde filozofların ilgi alanında ahlâkî problemler ön planda yer aldığı gibi, özellikle bilgi konusu da pratik açıdan ele alınarak doğru bilgiye ulaşıp ulaşamayacağı da bu ilgiden uzak kalmadı. Çünkü Sokrates, "Bilgi erdemdir." ifadesiyle, bilgi ile ahlâkın nihâî gayesi olan mutluluk arasında doğrudan bir bağ kurmuştu. Erdemli olmak, doğru ile yanlış birbirinden ayırt edip doğru olanı tercih ederek yapmaktan ibarettir. Böyle bir ayırımı yapabilmek, gerçek varlık hakkında bilgi sahibi olmaya bağlıdır. Yani gerçeğin bilgisini edinmeden, erdemli olunamaz. Mutluluk da doğrudan doğruya erdemli olmaya bağlıdır. Çünkü insan doğru eylemlerde bulunmaksızın mutlu olamaz. Doğru eylemde bulunmak da doğru bilgiye bağlı olduğuna göre, bilgi olmaksızın mutluluğa ulaşamaz. Buna göre bilgi, mutluluğun anahtarıdır ve çok yüksek derecede bir değeri vardır. Helenistik dönemle birlikte felsefe, pratik bir gaye olan 'bilgece yaşama'ya yöneldiği için bu dönemin bazı filozofları, 'bilgece yaşamının ne olduğunu araştırmaya ve böyle bir mutlu hayatın temel şartı olan bilgiyle de yakından alakadar olmaya başlamışlardır.

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SUZANNE UNIACKE

DOUBT

Doubt is often defined as a state of indecision or hesitancy with respect to accepting or rejecting a given proposition. Thus, doubt is opposed to belief. But doubt is also contrasted with certainty. Since it seems intelligible to say that there are many things we believe without being completely certain about them, it appears that we may not have a unitary concept of doubt.

Although doubt is often associated in philosophy with scepticism, historically the relation between the two is complex. Moreover, some philosophers deny that sceptical arguments have any essential connection with inducing doubts.

Sceptical doubts, as philosophers understand them, differ from ordinary doubts in their depth and generality. We all have doubts about some things. But the philosophical sceptic wonders whether we ever have the slightest reason to believe one thing rather than another. However, the reasonableness of such doubts – and even their intelligibility – remains controversial. The various attitudes philosophers adopt with respect to the status of sceptical doubts characterize the main approaches to epistemological theory.

1 Doubt, belief and certainty

2–3 Philosophical doubt

1 Doubt, belief and certainty

Dictionaries typically run together concepts such as

indecision and hesitancy, contrasting doubt with both belief and certainty. But as we can evidently believe something without being certain about it, it seems that our concept of doubt itself may not be clear-cut. It is tempting to speculate that this seeming duality is a result of competing epistemological traditions: an older tradition that identifies knowledge with demonstrative knowledge, hence with rational certainty (see CERTAINTY), and a newer tradition for which probabilistic justification is sufficient. But it is also worth noting that 'belief' has become a term of art. Outside philosophy, reference to a person's 'beliefs' is likely to mean their fundamental convictions and not just anything they might be said to accept. Even in philosophy, much discussion of doubt has had in the background questions about religious faith, which might also contribute to a dictionary's associating belief with certainty.

Thinking of belief in the modern philosopher's wide sense, how should we understand the relations between belief, certainty and doubt? One question concerns whether belief is an all-or-nothing matter or whether it admits of degrees. For Bayesians, although there are some beliefs to which we assign the highest possible strength, most belief is partial (see PROBABILITY THEORY AND EPISTEMOLOGY). So from a Bayesian standpoint, although there is a natural contrast between doubt and certainty, doubt is not opposed to belief.

What if we insist that belief is all-or-nothing? It is widely held that there are two types of certainty: subjective (which applies to persons), and objective (which applies to propositions). So we might say that, when we assent to propositions on inconclusive evidence, we recognize *them* to be less than certain but *we* have made up our minds. To assent is to eliminate subjective uncertainty – that is, doubt.

This is not conclusive. Even if belief is all-or-nothing, some beliefs are more firmly rooted than others. If we think of these degrees of entrenchment as degrees of subjective certainty, 'doubt versus belief' and 'doubt versus certainty' will draw different distinctions. In reply, we might say that a shallowly rooted proposition is one I regard as *doubtful* – that is, open to reasonable doubt – which does entail its being doubted. But it seems equally natural to say that this would be something I accept, while still having doubts about it. Our concept of doubt just may not be unitary.

2 Philosophical doubt

In philosophy, doubt has often been connected with scepticism. However, for the ancient sceptics, suspension of judgment is not doubt but its cure (see

جذر اصم

۷۷۵

روح الارواح فی شرح الاسماء الملك الفتح، چاپ نجیب مایل هروی، تهران ۱۳۶۸ ش؛ عمرین محمد سهروردی، کتاب عوارف المعارف، بیروت ۱۴۰۳/۱۹۸۳؛ عبدالرزاق کاشی، اصطلاحات الصوفیة، چاپ محمد کمال ابراهیم جعفر، مصر ۱۹۸۱؛ همو، شرح منازل السائرین، چاپ محسن بیدارفر، قم ۱۳۷۲ ش؛ محمودبن علی عزالدین کاشانی، مصباح الهدایه و مفتاح الکفایه، چاپ جلال‌الدین همایی، تهران ۱۳۶۷ ش؛ احمدبن محمد علاءالدوله سمنانی، العروة لأهل الخلوۃ و الجلوۃ، چاپ نجیب مایل هروی، تهران ۱۳۶۲ ش؛ همو، مصنفات فارسی، چاپ نجیب مایل هروی، تهران ۱۳۶۹ ش؛ عبدالله بن محمد عین‌القضاة، زیدة الحقایق، متن عربی به تصحیح عقیف عسیران، ترجمه فارسی مهدی تلدین، تهران ۱۳۷۹ ش؛ همو، نامه‌های عین‌القضاة همدانی، ج ۱، چاپ علینقی منزوی و عقیف عسیران، تهران [؟ ۱۹۶۹]؛ ابوبکر محمدبن ابراهیم کلاباذی، التعرف لمذهب اهل التصوف، دمشق ۱۹۸۶/۱۴۰۷؛ محمدبن یحیی لاهیجی، مفاتیح الاعجاز فی شرح گلشن‌راز، چاپ محمدرضا بزرگر خالقی و عفت کرباسی، تهران ۱۳۷۱ ش؛ اسماعیل بن محمد مستملی، شرح التعرف لمذهب التصوف، چاپ محمد روشن، تهران ۱۳۶۳-۱۳۶۶ ش؛ جلال‌الدین محمدبن محمد مولوی، مثنوی معنوی، براساس نسخه قونیه، چاپ عبدالکریم سروش، تهران ۱۳۷۸ ش؛ عبدالله بن محمد نجم‌رازی، مرصاد العباد، چاپ محمدمامین رباحی، تهران ۱۳۵۲ ش؛ عزیزالدین بن محمد نسفی، کشف الحقایق، چاپ احمد مهدوی دامغانی، تهران ۱۳۵۹ ش؛ همو، مقصد اقصی، در گنجینه عرفان، چاپ حامد ربانی، تهران: کتابخانه علمی حامدی، [؟ ۱۳۵۲ ش].

/ بابک عباسی /

جذر ← حساب، علم

جذر اصم، یکی از شبهات مهم منطقی. این شبهه را ابتدا متقدمانان یگاری (مگارا^۱ از شهرهای یونان) و رواقی مطرح کردند. بحث و تأمل در این شبهه، در بیش از ۲۳ قرن، موجب طرح تقریرهای مختلف، صورتهای تقویت شده^۲ و عرضه راه‌حلهای گوناگون برای آن شد و لوازم و آثار فراوانی را در منطق، معرفت‌شناسی و علم کلام پدید آورد.

دانشمندان مسلمان در قرن هفتم آن را شبهه جذر اصم خواندند، زیرا صعوبت و سختی حل آن، به جذر عدد اصم (گنگ) شباهت دارد (برای نمونه ← تفتازانی، ج ۴، ص ۲۸۷). شبهه جذر اصم درباره جمله‌ای است که صدق آن و صدق نقیض آن، مجموعاً، به تناقض می‌انجامد (← موحد، ۱۳۷۴ ش، ذیل "paradox"). تقریر نخست شبهه جذر اصم به صورت گزاره واحدی مطرح شد که متضمن حکم به کذب خود

که مقام نبوت نیز نه به کوشش بلکه به عنایت الاهی نصیب انبیا شده است (جامی، ۱۳۷۰ ش، ص ۴۹-۵۰). نسفی (۱۳۵۹ ش، ص ۸۱)، در طبقه‌بندی خویش، فضل و عنایت حق را به سه قسم عام، خاص و خاص‌الخاص تقسیم می‌کند که متناظر با سه مقام هدایت، ولایت و نبوت است. در عقیده او عنایت خاص حق، که همان جذبه است، به مقام ولایت مربوط می‌شود.

در تذکره‌ها و شرح احوال صوفیان، اخبار و اقوال بسیاری از اهل جذبه نقل شده است. مجذوبانی نیز از تجربه جذبه خود گزارش‌هایی داده‌اند (برای نمونه ← علاءالدوله سمنانی، ۱۳۶۲ ش، ص ۲۹۷-۲۹۹؛ همو، ۱۳۶۹ ش، ص ۲۵۲). ظاهراً نخستین کسی که در تاریخ تصوف از مجذوبان دانسته شده، ابراهیم ادهم (متوفی ۱۶۱) است. گفته‌اند وی شاهزاده بود و روزی به هنگام شکار ندایی شنید و به جذبه حق از غفلت به در شد و زهد پیشه کرد (← کلاباذی، ص ۱۴۱؛ انصاری، ص ۶۸-۷۲). همچنین فضیل عیاض (متوفی ۱۸۷) - که او را رئیس دزدان و راهزنان دانسته‌اند - با شنیدن آیه‌ای از قرآن به جذبه حق فرو رفت و توبه کرد (سمعانی، ص ۵۱۱). جامی در تفحات الانس (جاهای متعدد) شرح حال بسیاری از مجذوبان را آورده است که از آن جمله‌اند: محمد معشوق (قرن پنجم)، میرعلی عبو (قرن پنجم)، ابن‌فارض مصری (متوفی ۶۳۲)، علاءالدوله سمنانی (متوفی ۷۳۶)، خواجه حسن عطار (متوفی ۸۲۶)، جمال‌الدین لور، قوام‌الدین سنجانی (متوفی ۸۲۰) و شمس‌الدین محمد کوشوثی (متوفی ۸۶۳).

منابع: ابن‌عطاءالله اسکندری، کتاب الحکم: غرّبی - انجلیزی، چاپ عبدالحمید صالح حمدان، [قاهره، بی‌تا.]: ابونصر سراج، کتاب‌اللمع فی‌التصوف، چاپ رینولد آلن نیکلسون، لیدن ۱۹۱۴، چاپ افنت تهران [بی‌تا.]: احمدبن عبدالله ابونعیم، حلیة الاولیاء و طبقات الأصفیاء، بیروت ۱۳۸۷/۱۹۶۷؛ عبدالله بن محمد انصاری، طبقات الصوفیه، چاپ محمد سرور مولانی، تهران ۱۳۶۲ ش؛ محمدبن محمد پارسا، قدسیه: کلمات بهاء‌الدین نقشبند، چاپ احمد طاهری عراقی، تهران ۱۳۵۴ ش؛ نصرالله پورجوادی، سلطان طریقت: سوانح زندگی و شرح آثار خواجه احمد غزالی، تهران ۱۳۵۸ ش؛ عبدالرحمان بن احمد جامی، اشعة اللمعات فی شرح اللمعات، در گنجینه عرفان، چاپ حامد ربانی، تهران: کتابخانه علمی حامدی، [؟ ۱۳۵۲ ش]؛ همو، تفحات الانس، چاپ محمود عابدی، تهران ۱۳۷۰ ش؛ روزبهان بقلی، شرح شطحیات، چاپ هانری کورین، تهران ۱۳۶۰ ش؛ عبدالحسین زرین‌کوب، سزنی: نقد و شرح تحلیلی و تطبیقی مثنوی، تهران ۱۳۶۶ ش؛ احمدبن ابوالحسن ژنده‌بیل، منتخب سراج‌السائرین، چاپ علی فاضل، مشهد ۱۳۶۸ ش؛ محمدبن حسین سلمی، طبقات الصوفیه، چاپ نورالدین شریه، حلب ۱۹۸۶/۱۴۰۶؛ احمدبن منصور سماعانی،

1. Megara

2. strengthened forms

İSLÂM DİNİ DÜŞÜNÇESİNDE SEPTİSİZM*

JOSEF VAN ESS

Çev: Murat MEMİŞ*

SKEPTICISM IN ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

It is not clear that how and in which ways did Ancient skepticism come into Islamic thought. Because we do not have any knowledge that the works of Greek skeptics were translated into the Arabic. This is, probably, because of the fact that Moslem theologians have overlooked the skepticism. However, the cultural condition of Iran in pre-islamic period provided the skepticism with a favorable atmosphere for its penetration undercover into Islamic era. Thus, all whom called as “sofestaî” is Shi’i. It came to be possible to get a place for “skepticism for belief” in Islamic thought with Batinites in that they had assigned true knowledge to “innocent imam” and refused to accept the speculation. Ghazali maintained to use Aristotelian logic against them. Henceforth Batinite thoughts lost their significant and value.

Anahtar terimler: Septisizm, Kelâm, Batnîlik

Bazen felsefî problemler, karşıdaki kişinin tokatlanmasıyla halledilebilir –tabii karşıdaki kişinin böyle çözüme boyun eğmesi şartıyla-. Me’mun’un mâiyetinde Mu’tezilî kelamcı Sümâme b. Eşres’in (ö. 213/828), bir defasında böyle bir kimse bulduğu anlaşılıyor. İbn-i Abdırabbih, İkdu’l-Ferîd’inde aktardığına göre, Sümâme halifenin huzurunda şuna inanan birisiyle karşılaşmıştı: “Her şey hayal ve zandan ibarettir. Öyle ki, insan onları sadece kendi zihnine göre kavrar (yani subjektiftir) ve gerçeklik (dediğimiz şey)’te hiçbir doğruluk yoktur”. Sümâme cevap yerine ona öyle bir tokat attı ki, a-

* Bu makale ilk olarak Al-Abhath’ta yayınlanmıştır (c.XXI, ss.1-18, Mart 1968). [Elinizdeki tercümeye esas teşkil eden yayın ise, Beyrut Amerikan Üniversitesi tarafından 6-12. Şubat. 1967 tarihleri arasında düzenlenen “God and Man in Contemporary Islamic Thought” adlı felsefe sempozyumunda bildiri olarak sunulmuş ve 1972 yılında adı geçen üniversite tarafından yayımlanmıştır.]

* Ar.Gör., D.E.Ü.İlahiyat Fakültesi, İzmir

Gazzali

Şüphelik



Quest for New Science

(Selected papers of a Seminar)

Dr. R. Ahmad
Dr. Syed Naseem Ahmad

Edited by:
Dr. Rals Ahmad
Dr. Syed Naseem Ahmad

Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi	
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CENTRE FOR STUDIES ON SCIENCE
Sir Syed Nagar, Aligarh-202001, India

A Comparative Study of the Method of Doubt: Ghazzali and Descartes

Hameed Naseem Rafiabadi*

Al-Ghazzali and Descartes are the two giant philosophers who revolutionized the patterns of thought current in their respective times. A comparative study of these two philosophers shows the points of ideational convergences as well as contrasts between the two geographically and culturally apart worlds i. e. the Islamic world and the secular western world. While the impact of these two philosophers on their respective civilizations is historically recognised, their interrelationship and in a sense inter-dependence has not been fully appreciated. Thus a comparative study of the two is expected to be academically fruitful and philosophically rewarding.

One thing of which we may be sure is that the influence they exerted on history was through adopting a certain approach towards the philosophical issues which made a liberating effect both upon themselves as well as on their societies.¹ Al-Ghazzali is considered in Islamic history as a renovator and restorer of the Islamic puritanism which obviously indicates his immense ability in dismantling of the various acadmic currents which, if not heretical in themselves, were atleast resulting into the heresy. At the time of Ghazzali, as we know, the philosophical theology was dominated by the neo-platonists which was not a happy blend of religion and philosophy. Philosophers like Farabi and Ibn Sina reproduced the ideas of Plotinus and Porphyry with certain modifications. Their influence on the minds of educated persons was great, and if Ghazzali completely dismantled them, it certainly speak of his great intellectual accomplishments.

Descartes' position in western history of ideas is akin to that of Ghazzali in Islamic history. He is called the father of western philosophy and rightly so because he too gave a shattering jolt to the established patterns of thought which was dominated by the philosophical theology of Thom-

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NOTE: Makale s. 111-124 arazindadır

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Sophistic (182029)

Archiv für Philosophie.

I. Abteilung:

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.

Neue Folge. XXIV. Band, 2. Heft.

V.

Der Skeptizismus der Sumanija nach der Darstellung
des Rāzi 1209 †.

Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der philosophischen Bewegung im Islam und
ihrer Beziehung zu Indien.

Von

Privatdozent Dr. M. Horten in Bonn.

Die Lehren der philosophierenden Theologen des Islam waren bis zum XII. Jahrhundert zu einer solchen Fülle angewachsen, daß sich Razi 1209, einer der führenden Geister der Zeit, genannt König der Disputierenden (malik almunazirin) veranlaßt sah, in einem Kompendium¹⁾ alle diese Lehren systematisch und möglichst knapp zusammenzustellen. Für die Geschichte der philosophischen Bestrebungen besonders in der ältesten Zeit bildet dieses Werk daher eine unschätzbare Fundgrube. Razi schiebt seinem Werke zwei Einleitungen erkenntnistheoretischen Inhaltes voraus, von denen die erste über die primären, die zweite über die sekundären Erkenntnisse handelt. Das ganze Gebiet des Erkennens, das sich zusammensetzt aus a) Voraussetzungen (Wahrnehmung empirischer Tatsachen und ersten, in sich evidenten Prinzipien) und b) Ableitungen (der eigentliche Bereich der Spekulation) beabsichtigt er in dieser Weise klarzulegen. Demnach behandelt er in der ersten Einleitung die skeptischen Richtungen, von denen er drei aufzählt: 1. Skeptiker, die die Tatsachen der Sinneswahrnehmung leugnen. Als sichere Er-

¹⁾ Brockelmann: Gesch. d. arab. Literatur I, 507, V, Nr. 22. Tusi 1273 (ib. 510 Nr. 21) schrieb dazu kritische Anmerkungen. Dieser Studie liegt der Druck Kairo 1323 d. H. zugrunde.

28 MAR 2000

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28 MART 2003

Sophoclitik (182029)

Berichtigungen und Ergänzungen.

S. 6 Z. 12 lies *الضميعون* statt *الضميعين*. S. 8 Z. 25 lies „welche“ statt „welcher“. Das. Z. 26 lies „beschäftigten“ statt „beschäftigte“. Das. Z. 2 v. u. lies *الفلاسفة* statt *الفلاسفة*. S. 9 Z. 6 lies „b. Al-Hakam“ statt „Al-Hakam“. S. 13 Z. 17 lies „favos“ statt „furos“. S. 19 Z. 9 v. u. lies *عشرة* statt *عشر*. S. 20 Z. 5 v. u. lies *بطباعها* statt *بظباها*. S. 26 Z. 2 v. u. lies *الاختيار* statt *الاخبار*. S. 27 Z. 19 lies „natürlichen“ statt „natürlichsten“. Das. Z. 4 v. u. lies „formae volubilitas“ statt „formam volubilitatis“ und „ordo“ statt „orde“. S. 29 Z. 2 v. u. lies *العدل* statt *اعدل*. S. 37 Z. 24 lies „jenen“ statt „jenem“. S. 43 Z. 9 nach „Anschauung“ erg. in bezug auf das Pneuma, vgl. auch Em. ed. Landauer S. 107, ed. Slucki S. 55. S. 57 Z. 6 v. u. nach de Vaux erg. Gazzali. S. 65 A. 1. Der Satz: *لانا لوسميننا* usw. bedeutet wörtlich: Denn gesetzt, wir bezeichnen das Schwarze und die Bewegung mit Einem Namen und hätten nicht für das Schwarze und Weisse einen gemeinsamen Namen erfunden, so würden wir dennoch mit Notwendigkeit erkennen, dass zwischen dem Schwarzen und Weissen eine Verwandtschaft bestehe, die nicht zwischen dem Schwarzen und der Bewegung vorhanden sei. Das heisst: es liegt nicht an der Sprache, die gerade für Schwarz und Weiss eine gemeinsame Bezeichnung (scil. Farbe) hat, nicht aber für Schwarz und Bewegung, denn, wäre es selbst umgekehrt der Fall, würden wir dennoch erkennen, zwischen welchen Begriffen eine sachliche Verwandtschaft bestehe und zwischen welchen nicht. Sowohl Schmolders, Essai usw., S. 152, als auch Carra de Vaux, Gazzali S. 124 scheinen die Stelle anders aufzufassen, und darum hielten wir es für nötig, den Sinn genau wiederzugeben.

Jahres-Bericht

des

jüdisch-theologischen Seminars
Fraenckel'scher Stiftung

für das Jahr 1914.

Zur Gedächtnis-Feier für den Stifter,

Mittwoch, den 27. Januar 1915, vormittags 11 Uhr,

Wallstrasse 1b, 2 Tr.

Voran geht:

Der Einfluss der griechischen Skepsis auf die Entwicklung
der Philosophie bei den Arabern.

Von

Dr. S. Horowitz.

BRESLAU

Druck von Th. Schatzky G. m. b. H., Neue Graupenstr. 6.
1915.

28 MART 2003

-182029 ŞÜPHECİLİK
071151 GAZZALİ

9. ÇUBUKÇU, İbrahim Ağâh (Dr.) ✓

Ankara Üniv. İlähiyat Fak. Ankara 1963, 1 c, III+181 s, matbu.

Doçentlik tezinin adı :

" Gazzâli ve Şüphecilik. "

Yunan şüpheciliği. Gazzâli'den önce müslümanlar arasında şüphecilik. Gazzâli'nin hayatı ve çeşitli görüşleri. Gazzâli'nin şüpheciliği ve iman metodu. Gazzâli'nin kendinden önceki şüphecilerle karşılaştırılması. Bazı batılı filozoflarla mukayesesi yapılarak tez, özet mahiyetinde bir " Netice " ile tamamlanmaktadır.

22 OCAK 1994

kabul etmeyeceği mantıksız ve çelişkili bir tutumdur. Arapça'da buna dâir bir beyit vardır. Türkçesi şöyledir:

'Yaptığın işi yasaklama/Böyle yapman sana büyük ayıp yükler.'

İmâm Gazâlî, hem şerî'ata, hem akla göre hüküm verseydi, şöyle demesi gerekirdi: İnsanın yapmamakla emredildiği iki şeyden birini yapmıyorsa, onu yasaklayan kanuna, şerî'ata uyuyorsa, öteki şeyi de aynı kanun ve şerî'at yasaklamışsa, onu da yapmaması gerekir. Bir kanunu kabul edip yasakladığını yapmamak, aynı kanunun yasakladığı öteki fiili de yapmamayı gerektirir. Yasaklamayı gerektirmez, demekle yapmasını câiz gördüğünü ve en azından o yasağı küçümsediğini anlatmış olmuyor mu? eğer böyle anlaşılmamış olsaydı, Müslümanlar İslam'ın emir ve yasaklarının dışına bu kadar çıkabilirler miydi? kabahatlıyı bulmadan, kabahatler sorgulanamaz. Oysa Gazâlî, tasavvufu çarpıtmış olduğu aklını kullansaydı, şöyle demesi akla ve şerî'ata daha uygun olurdu: Hem içiyorsun, hem de içiriyorsun, içmeye izin veriyorsun, bu iki günahı yapacağına, hiç olmazsa bir tanesini yapıyorsan, ötekini yapma.

D3265

SEMANTİK ANALİZLER IŞIĞINDA KUR'AN'DA "REYB" VE "YAKÎN" KAVRAMLARI

Prof. Dr. İsmail YAKIT

S.D.Ü. İlahiyat Fakültesi

Yakin (220079)
Reybiik (170360)

In this paper some introductory information is about to be given as regards Semantics first, and then some Qur'anic terms such as rayb, shakk, yaqin will be analyzed. In order to successfully analyze any terms or concepts, their etymological structure has fundamental importance so as to connect it to its derivatives and not to disconnect any relevant concept from the original source. Hence, here we tried to display how one deals with a concept semantically without causing any confusion with others by defining its meaning and reference framework.

Keywords: Semantics, rayb, shakk, yaqin.

Semantik Hakkında

Grekçe "sémantiké-sémantikos"dan gelen semantik kelimesi "anlam veren, anlam belirten" demektir. "Semiologie" tabiri de "anlam bilimi"ne karşılık kullanılmaktadır. Arapça karşılığı "İlmu'l-ma'na"dır. Semantiğin birçok çeşitleri vardır: Analitique, structurale, synchronique, diachronique (historique) vs. Anlam ile kelimesini, kelime ile obje ilişkilerini, anlam değişikliklerini, kavram kargaşalığını, eş anlamlı, çok anlamlı kelimeleri ve onların yapısını vs. inceleyen bir bilim dalı olan semantiğin varlığı, dillerin çıkışı kadar eskidir ama bir bilim dalı olarak kuruluşu yenidir. Kısaca semantik bir bilim dalı olduğu kadar kavram kargaşasını önleme-ye, doğru anlamı bulmada bir metottur.¹

Semantik analiz ve etimolojik anlam bağları üzerinde birkaç örnek verdikten sonra asıl konumuza geçip "reyb" ve "yakîn" kavramlarını ele alacağız. Bir kelimenin veya kavramın semantik analizini yapabilmek için, ilkin, o kelimenin veya kavramın etimolojisini bilmek gerekir. Arapça bir kelime için tabiri caizse, onun deveden örneğini bulmak gerekir. Sonra o kelimenin türevlerinde ve tarih boyunca ka-

¹ Bkz. Yakıt, (İ.), "Doğru Bir Kur'an Tercümesinde Semantik Metodun Önemi", I. Din Şurası Tebliğleri, 1-5 Kasım 1993, Diyanet İşl. Başkanlığı, s.412, Ankara.

Şüph

MÜSLÜMANLARDA ŞÜPHECİLİK

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin ATAY

(İlmî Davranış)

Müslümanlarda şüpheciliğin kökünü İslâm'ın ana kaynağı Kur'an-dan başlamak lazımdır. Biz buradan işe başlayacağız. Ancak bunun derinliğine tartışmasını başka bir zamanda ele alacağız. Önce doğrudan şüpheyi ve ilmi ifade eden kelimelerin kullanılışlarında ihsas ve ilham etmek istedikleri manayı tesbit etmek gerekir. Böylece bu kelimelerden anlaşılan veya anlatılan manayı kavramak daha uygun olur.

Kur'andaki ilimle ilgili kelimeler: a) İlim, b) Marifet, c) Zan, d) Hars (tahmin), e) Rayb, f) Şüph, g) Şek, h) Dirayet, yakın ve i) Hikmet kelimelerinin sözlük manalarının ne olduğunu inceleyelim. Çünkü Araplar bunların sözlük manalarını anlıyorlardı ve bu manalar onları harekete geçirmişti. Başlangıç noktası olarak bunu aldıktan sonra, tarih boyunca ilimlerin gelişmesiyle bu kelimelere de daha geniş ve felsefi ve istidlâli manalar verilmiştir. Şunu ifade etmek tarihi ve ilmî bir gelişimin neticesini bildirmekten başka bir şey değildir. Arap diline Kur'anı Kerim'in verdirdiği ehemmiyet sadece bütün müslümanlar tarafından asırlar boyunca hem ilim ve hem de din lisanı olduğunu sağlamamıştır. Ayrıca Arap kabilelerini ve dillerini birleştirirken, lehçelerinde olan farklılıkların muhafaza edilmesini de temin etmiş ve böylece Arapça en azından bazı sahalarda farklı inceliklerin ifade edilebilmesine ait çok değişik kelimeleri ihtiva etmesine yardım etmiştir. Türkler müslüman olduktan sonra dillerine ehemmiyet vermediklerinden hem dil birliği meydana gelmemiş, hem de dilleri ilmî meseleleri incelikleriyle ifade edecek gelişmeden mahrum bırakılmıştır. Bilim felsefesi, etimolojik ve semantik tahlilleri yapılmadan o dil ilim dili vasfını kazanamaz. Arapça'nın tarih boyunca felsefesi ve tahlili yapılmışsa da modern metotlarla da yapmaya devam etmek gerekir. Bunun içindir ki, Kur'anın bile kelimelerinin tahlilinde tam Türkçe karşılık bulmanın zorluğu ile karşılaşılıyor ve incelikleri tam olarak ifade edip aktaramıyoruz.

D1 / İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, c. 28, s. 1, 1986 (ANKARA)

Not: Bu makale 1-22 sayfaları arasındadır.

Dergi Ansiklopedi kütüphanesinde mevcuttur.

Euphectik

Iceland

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DAGFINN FØLLESDAL

✓ SCEPTICISM

Simply put, scepticism is the view that we fail to know anything. More generally, the term 'scepticism' refers to a family of views, each of which denies that some term of positive epistemic appraisal applies to our beliefs. Thus, sceptical doctrines might hold that none of our beliefs is certain, that none of our beliefs is justified, that none of our beliefs is reasonable, that none of our beliefs is more reasonable than its denial, and so on. Sceptical doctrines can also vary with respect to the kind of belief they target. Scepticism can be restricted to beliefs produced in certain ways: for example, scepticism concerning beliefs based on memory, on inductive reasoning or even on any reasoning whatsoever. And sceptical views can be restricted to beliefs about certain subjects: for example, scepticism concerning beliefs about the external world, beliefs about other minds, beliefs about value and so on. Solipsism – the view that all that exists is the self and its states – can be seen as a form of scepticism based on the claim that there are no convincing arguments for the existence of anything beyond the self.

The philosophical problem of scepticism derives from what appear to be very strong arguments for sceptical conclusions. Since most philosophers are unwilling to accept those conclusions, there is a problem concerning how to respond to the arguments. For example, one kind of sceptical argument attempts to show that we have no knowledge of the world around us. The argument hinges on the claim that we are not in a position to rule out the possibility that we are brains-in-a-vat being artificially stimulated to have just the sensory experience we are actually having. We have no basis for ruling out this possibility since if it were actual, our experience would not change in any way. The sceptic then claims that if we cannot rule out the possibility that we are brains-in-a-vat, then we cannot know anything about the world around us.

Responses to this argument often fall into one of two categories. Some philosophers argue that we can rule out the possibility that we are brains-in-a-vat. Others argue that we do not need to be able to rule out this possibility in order to have knowledge of the world around us.

- 1 The philosophical problem of scepticism
- 2 Responses to scepticism
- 3 Relevant alternatives fallibilism
- 4 *Modus ponens* fallibilism
- 5 The role of intuitions

1 The philosophical problem of scepticism

Most contemporary discussions of scepticism have focused on scepticism concerning the external world. We can use this type of scepticism to illustrate the broader philosophical problem, as many of the arguments we consider can be applied *mutatis mutandis* to other types of scepticism.

One type of scepticism denies that we know anything about the external world. The view is not simply that, for example, by gathering more evidence we could come to know. Rather, it is that we are unable to attain knowledge. On the plausible assumption that knowledge entails justified belief, scepticism concerning knowledge follows from scepticism concerning justified belief – the view that justified belief about the external world is unattainable.

Scepticism is of philosophical interest because there appear to be very strong arguments that support it. This presents us with the problem of how to respond to these arguments. One way would be to accept their conclusion. Of course, very few philosophers are willing to do this. There are very few actual sceptics. So the problem of scepticism is how to refute or in some way neutralize or deflate the force of these arguments.

In the history of philosophy, some sceptical arguments have been based on the unreliability or relativity of our senses (see PYRRHONISM), or upon the inability of reason to produce non-question begging arguments for our beliefs (see HUME, D. §2). Nearly all sceptical arguments exploit sceptical hypotheses or alternatives. Sceptical alternatives suppose that the world is very different from what we would normally believe on the basis of our sensory evidence. This entails that our sensory evidence is radically misleading. More precisely, suppose we claim to know a proposition *q* on the basis of evidence *e*. Let (proposition) *h* be an alternative to *q* just in case *h* is incompatible with *q* (*q* and *h* cannot both be true). Then *h* is a sceptical alternative to *q* provided *h* is an alternative to *q* compatible with *e*. An alternative of

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[D. R. CAMPBELL]

SIXTUS OF SIENA, Biblical scholar; b. Siena, 1520; d. Genoa, 1569. Converted from Judaism in his youth, he first became a Franciscan, but later, when convicted of heresy and condemned to death, he was spared through the intercession of Michael Ghislieri, OP (later Pius V), who persuaded him to recant and become a Dominican (1551). In 1559 he was appointed censor of Hebrew books by Pius V, and in this office he was able to save many valuable works from destruction. In 1566 he published at Venice his celebrated *Bibliotheca Sacra*, containing eight "books" in two volumes: (1) division and authority of Scripture, (2) alphabetic and historical indexes, (3) interpretation of the inspired books, (4) alphabetic list of Catholic interpreters, (5) hermeneutics [also published separately as *De arte interpretandi sacra volumina* (Cologne 1577)], (6) and (7) exegetical interpretations, and (8) apologia. Some later editions arrange the eight books in a different order. Since it was based on scientific principles, this work is considered to be the first of the modern *Biblical introductions. In it were used for the first time the terms protocanonical and deutero-canonical that later became standard for distinguishing respectively the OT books that are regarded as canonical by Jews and Protestants as well as by Catholics and those that are so regarded only by Catholics.

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[A. SMITH]

SKARGA, PIOTR, eminent Polish preacher, theologian, and apologist; b. Grójec, Mazovia, 1536; d. Cracow, Sept. 27, 1612. He attended the parish school at Grójec, went on to the University of Cracow (B.A. 1554), was ordained at Lvov (1564), and entered the Jesuit novitiate. He studied theology in Rome (1564-71) and was appointed professor at Pułusk College (1571). He abandoned his teaching career for preaching and missionary activities (he converted the Radziwill princes and their Lithuanian subjects) and founded or enlarged Jesuit colleges in Ryga, Dorpat, Połock, Nieśwież, and Lublin. He was first rector of the Academy (university) of Vilna (1579-84).

To uphold Catholicism and to convert Protestants and schismatics, Skarga wrote many treatises, usually in Polish, such as *Pro Ssma. Eucharistia* (1576; Eng. tr. Milwaukee 1939); *O Jedności Kościoła Bożego* (1577, On the Unity of the Church of God). The Union of Brest (1596), which united the schismatic Ruthenians with Rome, was widely attributed to the influence of Skarga's apologetic treatises.

Zywoty Swietych (1579, Lives of the Saints) has been most widely read by Poles through the centuries. Rather than simply translate, Skarga artistically transformed *Lippomano's hagiographic work by adapting it to the Polish mentality, adding original commentaries,

and including new biographies. Outstanding for philosophic depth and finesse of style is *Kazania na Niedziele i Swieta* (1595, Sermons for Sundays and Holydays). Skarga published his powerful *Kazania o Siedmiu Sakramentach* (1600, Sermons on the Seven Sacraments), together with *Kazania Przygodne* (Sermons on Various Occasions) and his prophetic *Kazania Sejmowe* (Sermons Preached to the Diet). The last work, a national examination of conscience, greatly influenced Polish literary and patriotic thought, particularly in the 19th century.

Skarga's profound eloquence combined with piety and humility to win him the name of the Polish Bossuet. He founded many charitable societies in major Polish cities: *Bractwo Miłosierdzia* (the Brotherhood of Charity), *Bractwo Betanii Sw. Łazarza* (the Brotherhood of St. Lazarus of Bethany) to care for the sick, *Skrzynka Sw. Mikołaja* (St. Nicholas' Chest) to shield young girls, and especially the *Bank Pobożny* to protect the poor from usurers. He spent the last 24 years of his life as King Zygmunt III's preacher, using his prestige and power solely for the good of his Church and his country, to which he had given a salutary program for reform.

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[T. F. DOMARADZKI]

SKEPTICISM

The term skepticism (Gr. *σκέπτομαι*, to examine) designates a variety of approaches to philosophical problems. According to popular usage, a skeptic is a person who, as a general rule, or in a particular instance, hesitates or refuses to accept the truth of propositions. Skepticism may be a mere psychological attitude, or a deliberate doctrine; it may be systematic or unsystematic, partial or total. Philosophical skepticism usually implies more than mere caution or a readiness to examine problems; otherwise most philosophies would have to be termed skeptical, since they involve methodical reflection on man, knowledge, and being. Rather it has come to be indissolubly associated with *doubt, i.e., an inability to form one's judgment; thus doubt is the skeptic's characteristic reaction in the face of theoretical problems.

While a number of names in the history of philosophy have been identified with skepticism, historians generally fail to acknowledge the extent of their influence on the development of philosophical thought. For this reason, the present treatment first sketches the historical development of skepticism, and then gives a systematic analysis of its basic concepts and presuppositions.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SKEPTICISM

The history of skepticism fits naturally into three main divisions, corresponding to those used to describe the evolution of philosophy itself. Its foundations were laid by the Greeks; it was revived, largely under fideist influences, in the medieval and Renaissance periods; and it emerged as a philosophical system, although with many variations, during the early development of modern philosophy.

Greek Skeptics. Ancient skepticism was fostered by two schools, one Pyrrhonian and the other Academic.