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Press soon went out of print, the work has generally been accessible to younger scholars only via a research library, and has perhaps been used less thoroughly than it ought to have been. Its re-issue, with an affordable paperback edition, is therefore very welcome.

Welcome too is Feroz Ahmad's biographical introduction, describing how Berkes' career suffered from the vagaries of academic existence in Turkey during the 1930s and 1940s, but also how these experiences contributed to his emergence as a highly-respected historical sociologist. This provides an extra dimension to the book. Born in Cyprus in 1908, Berkes studied in Istanbul from 1922 onwards, but lacking influential connections found it hard to establish himself either as a teacher of philosophy (his first degree) or later as a sociologist. Formative periods were spent working in the Ankara *halkevi* in the early 1930s, and from 1935 as a research fellow in the Sociology Department of the University of Chicago. Returning to Turkey at the outbreak of the Second World War, Berkes taught at the newly-opened Philosophy Department at the University of Ankara, and published on a range of topics, including Namik Kemal and Ziya Gökalp, and economic, social and educational developments in the new Republic. However, due partly to these writings and partly to the fact that he failed to declare himself a firm supporter of the then Turkish government, he soon found himself under suspicion as a communist sympathizer, and for 4 years from 1947 to 1950 was one of four academics especially targeted as dissidents, sacked from their teaching posts, and ultimately driven out of the country.

Berkes' major works were published during his years as Professor of Islamic Studies at McGill University in Canada from 1952 to 1975, including his translations from Ziya Gökalp (*Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, London, 1959), an economic history of Turkey, and studies of nationalist and socialist ideology in Turkey and the Arab world (all in Turkish). *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* was conceived as a case study to show how, despite tremendous economic and technological development, 'a transformation is needed in political, social, cultural, and religious structures and values before such economic changes can be effective' (p. 507). Berkes' background in these various areas of study, and his enforced exile with time to reflect upon them, resulted in a book which was a study not only of historical development but of the nature of the continuing problems of modern Turkish society. It is regarded in the West as his *magnum opus*.

Berkes died in 1988, having spent his last years in relatively obscure retirement in south-east England. However, as a result of the changed political climate in Turkey after 1960, he was then writing more for a Turkish readership and continued to do so whilst in England. His books, essays and articles on contemporary issues for the Turkish press—in particular, on political development, socialism and Islam—were widely read and reprinted. His work remains highly relevant for both Turkish and non-Turkish students of modern Turkey.

UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM CHRISTINE WOODHEAD

FUNDAMENTALISM REBORN? AFGHANISTAN AND THE TALIBAN. Edited by WILLIAM MALEY. London, C. Hurst & Co., 1998, 253 pp.

Fay Weldon in her 1998 Channel Four drama 'Big Women' sounded off on the Taliban. She used the word as shorthand for extremists, backwardness, and prejudice against women. Fay Weldon is supported by other strong feminine voices. Dr Madeleine Albright said of them 'I think it is very clear why we are opposed to the Taliban. Because of their approach to human rights, their despicable treatment of women and children and their general lack of respect for human dignity' (in the chapter on 'The United States and the Taliban' by Richard Mackenzie, p. 90). The word Taliban has now, like fatwa, entered the English language.

In the mid-1990s the Taliban emerged and 'inspired by leaders like Mullah Muhammad Omar, they went on to seize Kandahar, Herat, then, in 1996, the capital Kabul itself. Their harsh treatment of women and the non-Pukhtun minority aroused the hostility of the world. There was a grisly massacre of Hazaras on 14 September 1997.

The Taliban, and there is consensus on this, are defined by their ethnic Pukhtun tribal background. Mostly young, mostly educated in madrasas, situated in Pakistan, they have entered national politics perhaps for the first time in Afghanistan's history. The experts clearly point out the impact of the refugee camps and madrasas in Pakistan on the Taliban. It is a new generation of Pukhtun leaders that now head the Taliban.

The Taliban themselves are not strangers to the land. The young Winston Churchill noted the presence of similar groups in his *The Story of the Malakand Field Force* at the turn of the century. He pointed out that they were remarkably like their counterparts in Turkey. To complicate matters, Afghanistan is clearly being used as a battleground between Saudi Arabia, backing the Taliban, and Iran opposing them. Anwar-ul-haq Ahady in his chapter points out the high stakes in the struggle for Afghanistan. Central Asia, Iran, the Arab world, Pakistan, the US and Russia, not to mention China and India, all have an interest in the land. It is a pivotal State in the geo-politics of Central Asia, South Asia and even the Middle East. Intense geopolitical rivalries are being played out—as in the past—in its remote valleys and mountains.

The editor, William Maley, has put together the opinions of about a dozen experts in the field. It has a healthy spread in perspective from geopolitics to the local and ethnic. The usual suspects, the well-known names, are included. Maley himself has contributed generously to the volume. Apart from editing it, he has a preface, a lengthy introduction and also manages to slip in a separate chapter. Perhaps he should have developed his own work as a fully fledged independent volume. Experts often disagree, and in the end the reader in search of answers is left as confused as he was when he began the book. For instance, Olivier Roy and Ahmed Rashid disagree on several important issues. Ahmed Rashid concludes his chapter thus: 'The threat of an Islamic revolution in Pakistan has never been greater' (p. 89). Olivier Roy, on the other hand, concludes his chapter: 'In this sense, they also embody the failure of Islamism' (p. 211).

Maley's description of the Taliban as a 'maverick fundamentalism' and his conclusion that 'their message is unlikely to spread' (see the chapter 'Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban', p. 27) is simply not correct. Elements of Taliban 'thinking' and expression are to be found throughout movements such as these in the Muslim world, even today. And as for the spread of this thinking, one has only to visit Pakistan to see its impact.

On several visits to Pakistan in 1999 I noted Pakistani versions of the Taliban active in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province. Indeed, they had taken to attacking video and television shops and threatening women in the marketplaces. Even in Islamabad, the capital of the country, there were groups of young men walking around in an aggressive manner and local mosques often broadcast what sounded like Taliban style philosophy.

Professor Nazif Shahrani in a key chapter at the end of the book, while giving a historical *tour de force*, also creates certain confusion in the ethnic debate now engulfing the nation. Shahrani is a non-Pukhtun and a well-known commentator in the debate on Afghanistan. Shahrani takes the unusual step of declaring his ethnic loyalties at the start of his essay. He then even goes on to recount the argument that he had with the Afghan Pukhtun Professor Hasan Kakar, a distinguished historian, who 'vehemently objected to my views' (p. 234, footnote 38). Academic neutrality is thrown to the winds as the Taliban are described as 'misguided', 'rampaging', 'unIslamic' and guilty of 'inhumane practices' (p. 236, footnote 39).

Shahrani continues in this vein and even blames Pakistan for wanting to become

Taliban (G193009)
Matüridi (130435)

CHAPTER 5

The Taliban and the Maturidite School

Few places in the Islamic world have seen as much Islamist activity in recent years as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Thus no analysis of Islamism and its important ties to Athari thought is complete without some discussion of the region and its most well-known movement, the Taliban. The origins of the Taliban are complex and interwoven with an elaborate web of ethnic conflict, political ambition, ideological warfare, and economic interests. But at its root, the story of the Taliban begins with the madrasas of western Pakistan and the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of South Asia. The dominant Sunni school of law in South Asia is the Hanafi *maddhab*. This would suggest that the Sunni Muslims of Pakistan and their institutions of religious learning are also associated with the Maturidite school of theology, or at least its creedal manifestation. That would include the Sunni Muslims of the modern reform-minded Deobandi madrasa movement. But the turbulent events of the last forty years dramatically changed the religious landscape of the region and displaced the normative Hanafi Sunnism that had been dominant there for centuries. This chapter explores those events and demonstrates that the Taliban movement is the product of distinctly Athari madrasas, funded and mobilized by Wahhabite-Atharis in the Persian Gulf and their Pakistani allies for the sake of political and economic interests. As such, claims that the Taliban is somehow a

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