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The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries

Edited by

Gábor Kármán and Lovro Kunčević

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Ukrayna (200413)

COSSACK UKRAINE IN AND OUT OF OTTOMAN ORBIT, 1648–1681

Victor Ostapchuk

In the second half of the seventeenth century a great upheaval occurred in the Ukrainian territories of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth that led to the unraveling and eventual transformation of the international order in Eastern Europe. For more than a generation the revolt against the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth sparked in 1648 by Bohdan Khmelnytsky, hetman of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, and the ensuing wars and social upheavals, to greater or lesser extents drew in most near and distant neighbors—in particular the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate, Moldavia, Transylvania, Muscovy, and Sweden. This whirlwind of events eventually brought the Ottoman Empire and Muscovy into their first major military conflict (the 1569 Ottoman Don–Volga–Astrakhan expedition and later proxy encounters in the North Caucasus notwithstanding) and contributed to the demise of the Commonwealth. By the late 1660s the Ottomans felt compelled to reverse their centuries-old policy of avoiding expansion beyond the northern Black Sea coastal region and engage in an active northern policy that led to a struggle for the steppes between the Dniester and Dnieper Rivers and beyond.

Between the Ukrainian revolt of 1648 and the Treaty of Bahçesaray of 1681, when the Porte effectively abandoned its active northern Black Sea policy, though it still held on to Podolia, a major subplot emerged: the search by Cossack hetmans and Ottoman sultans and viziers and their respective envoys for mutually agreeable terms by which Cossack Ukraine,¹ once a fierce foe of the Turks and Tatars, could become a subject

¹ By “Cossack Ukraine” we refer to those areas of Ukraine dominated by the Ukrainian (as opposed to the Russian Don) Cossacks—originally these were in the lower Dnieper region, known as Zaporozhia (south of the modern city of Zaporizhe). After 1648, we use the term “Cossack Ukraine” to indicate in addition those territories no longer under the control of the Commonwealth, that is, the provinces of Kiev, Bratslav, and Chernihiv, but not the predominantly ethnic Ukrainian provinces of the Polish Crown Podolia, Volhynia, and eastern Galicia (region of Lviv, so-called Red Ruthenia). Although the boundaries of Cossack Ukraine waxed and waned during the upheavals of our period the conventional name Hetmanate has been used to refer to this polity because of the presence of

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Roger Caratini dictionnaire

des nationalités et des minorités
de l'ex-U.R.S.S.

PARIS CEDEX © Larousse, 1992

mongoles et les langues toungouses, réparties en huit groupes géographiques (voir l'article sur les langues altaïques et la carte p. 268.)

TURKMÈNE — Langue turque du groupe du Sud-Ouest, dit aussi groupe oghouz ; c'est la langue des Turkmènes qui vivent dans les RSS du Turkménistan, d'Ouzbékistan, du Tadjikistan, mais aussi en Afghanistan, en Perse et dans le Caucase (région de Stavropol) ; elle est parlée par 2 480 000 locuteurs en URSS et par environ 300 000 locuteurs hors d'URSS. (Voir cartes p. 268 et p. 272.)

TURKMÈNES — Peuple turc, vivant en Asie Centrale soviétique, aux confins de l'Iran et de l'Afghanistan. (Voir cartes p. 268 et p. 272.)

Voici la légende que tous les Turkmènes vous conte lorsque vous mettez le pied au Turkménistan : Dieu a créé la Terre, et a donné aux Turkmènes les plus grands espaces ; puis il créa le Soleil et il leur a donné le plus de rayons solaires possibles ; puis il créa l'eau et il la donna à ceux qui n'avaient ni terre, ni soleil : c'est pourquoi le Turkménistan, avec 488 100 km², n'est qu'un vaste désert, le désert du

« sable noir », du *kara kum* comme on dit en turc, du Karakoum comme on l'écrit sur les atlas en langue française (350 000 km² : les trois-quarts de la superficie totale du Turkménistan) ...sans compter les steppes désertiques. Bref, dans cet immense territoire bordé par la mer Caspienne sur sa façade orientale, il y a à peine 5 000 ou 10 000 km² où l'on peut vivre humainement. Le niveau de la Caspienne baisse sans cesse : peut-être sera-t-elle un jour à sec ; il y a bien un fleuve, l'Amour-Darya, mais l'irrigation l'épuise (le canal du Karakoum a 800 km de long). Malgré cela, on peut y faire quelques cultures, et particulièrement celle du coton. La richesse est sous terre : le pétrole, le gaz naturel font du Turkménistan la troisième région pétrolière de l'URSS.

Le Turkménistan est peu dense démographiquement : 3 622 000 habitants, pour un pays aussi vaste que la France, dont 2 477 000 Turkmènes ; la capitale de la RSS de Turkménie est Achkhabad, avec 407 000 habitants en 1990 (sans sa « banlieue », où vivent 1 500 000 personnes). Autrefois, les Turkmènes étaient des pasteurs nomades, comme bien des Turcs ; leurs tribus s'appelaient Tékés, Djomouts, Saryks, etc. Ils ont été conquis, à partir de 1860, par la Russie qui en avait fait la région administrative appelée « région transcaspienne du Turkestan ». La révolution d'Octobre en a fait la RSS de Turkménie, en mai 1925. Les Turkmènes sont musulmans sunnites, de rite hānāfite.

UVVYZ

UKRAÏNE — République fédérée de l'URSS, dont la capitale est Kiev ; c'est la plus peuplée des Républiques soviétiques, après la RSFSR, et la plus riche ; l'ukrainien est une langue slave qui s'est séparée, à partir du XII^e siècle, du russe et du biélorusse (Voir carte p. 263.)

La RSS d'Ukraine a une superficie de 603 700 km², une population de 51 839 000 habitants, dont 73,6 % d'Ukrainiens, 21,1 % de Russes, 1,3 % de Juifs et 0,8 % de Biélorusses. La capitale, Kiev, abrite 2 616 000 habitants en 1990, c'est la troisième ville d'URSS, après Moscou et Leningrad. L'Ukraine possède les terres les plus riches de l'URSS ; elle produit 23 % des moissons de l'Union et ses terres élèvent 21 % de son bétail, avec 33 millions d'hectares cultivés. Elle est riche aussi en matières premières : le bassin du Donets contient 60 % des réserves soviétiques en anthracite et en bitumes ; les minerais y sont abondants (fer, manganèse) ; il y a aussi du pétrole, du gaz naturel et des gisements de toutes sortes. Les Ukrainiens sont chrétiens, avec deux Églises importantes : l'Église orthodoxe grecque et l'Église catholique romaine ; l'Église uniata avait été obligée de se rallier à l'Église romaine en 1596, sous la domination polonaise, elle a maintenant rejoint, depuis 1946, l'Église orthodoxe.

Histoire — Les Slaves apparaissent entre la Vistule et le Don à l'époque du Haut-Empire romain. Ils se répandent alors vers la Baltique, la plaine germano-polonaise et les Balkans. Les premiers États slaves occidentaux ont été créés en Moravie (vers 833), en Croatie (vers 877), en

Slovaquie (vers 890) et en Serbie (vers 931) ; le premier État slave oriental a été fondé par un chef varègue (branche des Vikings), le Danois Rjurik, en 862 : c'est l'État de Kiev, qui devient très vite un État chrétien, formé de plusieurs principautés. Il sera morcelé à l'époque des invasions mongoles, puis envahi par les Lituaniens et les Polonais (vers 1350-1360). L'Ukraine deviendra ensuite la vassale de la Pologne, qui lui imposera le catholicisme romain en 1596 (« Union de Brest »). Les révoltes du peuple ukrainien contre l'oppression polonaise bénéficient ensuite de l'appui des Cosaques, qui construisent la forteresse de Kharkov (1655), au centre d'une région qui porte le nom d'*Ukraine Slobidska*. Les Cosaques soutiennent aussi l'Église orthodoxe à laquelle sont restés fidèles les paysans. Finalement, après de nombreuses guerres entre Cosaques et Polonais, l'Ukraine se met sous la protection du tsar russe, mais perd tout espoir d'autonomie future, partagée entre l'Empire russe naissant et le puissant royaume de Pologne. À l'issue des partages de la Pologne, en 1793 et 1796, l'Ukraine est rattachée à la Russie. Le XIX^e siècle voit le prodigieux développement économique de l'Ukraine, qui participe aux différents mouvements, intellectuels ou militants, qui s'opposent à l'absolutisme tsariste.

La République soviétique (indépendante) d'Ukraine est proclamée en 1917, à Kharkov (le 25 décembre) ; mais il a existé parallèlement, de 1917 à 1920, une « République démocratique ukrainienne » indépendante, non soviétique. En juin 1919, l'Ukraine signe avec la Russie soviétique un accord militaire et politique et, le 30 décembre 1922, elle adhère à l'Union soviétique avec le statut de Répu-

■ أوكرانيا

الأودية والمجاري النهرية العميقة، ولكن أكثرها مغطى برواسب سميكة من عصري الباليوجين والنيوجين (الحقب الثالث)، وتغطي القسم الشرقي منها (منطقة الدونباس أي حوض (الدون) رواسب سميكة من العصر الكربوني (الحقب الأول) تحتوي ثروة مهمة من الفحم الحجري.

تقع مرتفعات فولين - بودول بين جبال الكاربات ونهر الدنيبر، وتؤدي هذه المرتفعات ذات القاعدة البلورية إلى تغيير مجرى الدنيبر ودفعه نحو الشرق، كما أدت الصخور الغرانيتية هنا إلى تكوّن الشلالات الكثيرة على النهر نفسه.

والى الجنوب الشرقي من تلك المرتفعات يمتد منخفض البحر الأسود في منطقة واسعة بمحاذاة شواطئ البحر الأسود وبحر آزوف. وهو سهل منبسط، لا يزيد ارتفاعه على ١٠ - ٢٥ متراً، تعترضه أحياناً منخفضات واسعة، ويستمر امتداد هذا المنخفض جنوباً ليضم

الغرب إلى الشرق بطول ١٣١٦ كم، ومن الشمال إلى الجنوب بطول ٨٩٣ كم وعاصمتها كييف [ر]. Kiev.

الأوضاع الجغرافية الطبيعية


التضاريس: تضاريس أوكرانيا هادئة ذات سطح سهلي عام يدخل في السهل الأوربي الكبير المتسع شرقاً. ومعظم أراضي الجمهورية (نحو ٧٠٪ من مساحتها)، مناطق سهلية قليلة الارتفاع (بين ١٠٠-٢٠٠ متر فوق سطح البحر).

وتؤلف الهضاب والتلال المنخفضة فيها نحو ٢٥٪ من أراضيها، التي يراوح ارتفاعها بين ٣٠٠ و ٤٠٠ م. في حين لا تؤلف المناطق المرتفعة والجبلية أكثر من ٥٪ من مساحتها، وتتركز في الغرب حيث تمتد السلاسل الشرقية لجبال الكاربات، وفي الأطراف الجنوبية حيث ترتفع سلاسل جبال القرم.

تؤلف الصخور البلورية ركيزة السهول الأوكرانية، وهي تظهر على السطح في بطون

جمهورية أوكرانيا R.Ukraine دولة أوربية شرقية، وأوكرانية تعني «عند الحدود» لأنها كانت تؤلف حداً جغرافياً للبلاد الروسية القديمة مع أوربة. وهي جمهورية حديثة النشأة استقلت عام ١٩٩١ عن الاتحاد السوفييتي (سابقاً). وهي ذات موقع جغرافي مهم، إذ تعدّ موانئها الواقعة على البحر الأسود [ر] وبحر آزوف [ر] البوابات الجنوبية المؤدية إلى البحار الدافئة وأوربة الغربية وجميع قارات المعمورة.

تقع جمهورية أوكرانيا جنوب غربي القسم الأوربي لروسية الاتحادية، ويحدها من الشمال جمهورية بيلوروسية (روسية البيضاء)، ومن الشمال الشرقي والشرق روسية الاتحادية، ومن الجنوب البحر الأسود وبحر آزوف، ومن الجنوب الغربي جمهورية مولداوية وجمهورية رومانية وهنغارية ومن الغرب جمهورية سلوفاكية وبولندية. تبلغ مساحتها ٦٠٣، ٧٠٠ كم^٢، وتمتد من



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


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Handwritten text in Ottoman Turkish script, likely a list or table of contents, arranged in columns.

Ek XVII - BA, TD, nr. 287, s. 317-318.

Appendix XVII - BA, TD, nu. 287, pp. 317-318.



OSMANLI-UKRAYNA MÜNASEBETLERİNİN BAŞLAMASI*


Prof. Dr. MÜCTEBA İLGÜREL

Osmanlı Devleti'nin Rumeli'deki fetihleri, bu devletin büyümesini sağlarken değişik milletlerle de teması gündeme getiriyordu. Bu fetihler devam ettikçe birçok Balkan milleti Osmanlı Devleti câmiasına katılıyordu. Bu yüzden devlet büyüyor ve sınırları genişliyordu. XVI. yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti, bünyesinde değişik ırkları bulunduran bir imparatorluk hâline gelmişti. Bu ırklar aynı zamanda değişik din ve mezheplere de mensup bulunuyorlardı. Osmanlı Devleti'nin fethettiği ülkelerin halkını hoş tutması, dinî serbestiyet tanınması bu yayılmayı kolaylaştırdı. Böylece köylü ve kilise Osmanlı himayesine de alınmış, aynı zamanda halkın gönlü de hoş tutulmuştu. Kısaca ilk devir kaynaklarında görülen "istimalet" politikası olarak izah edilen bu yayılma âdeta zorunlu bir hal almıştı. İşte bu genişleme siyaseti Osmanlı Devleti'ni, II. Bâyezid devrinde henüz Moskova civarında büyümekte olan Moskova Knezliği (Grandük) ile temasa getirdi. Nitekim III. İvan (1462-1505), civarındaki knez ve derebeyleri Moskova'ya bağlayıp ve Rusya'nın temellerini atıyordu. İşte bu sırada Altınordu Hanlığı eski gücünü kaybediyordu. Rusya'nın toprakları bu devlet aleyhinde genişliyordu. Nitekim Altınordu Devleti'nin parçalanmasından sonra Rusya daha rahat bir şekilde bu ülkenin topraklarına yerleşmiştir.

Osmanlı Devleti ile Rusya arasındaki münasebetlerin başlaması bir Rus elçisinin Türk kuvvetleri tarafından ahkonulması üzerine olmuştur. III. İvan tarafından Macar Kralı Mathias Korvinus'a gönderilen Rus elçisi Fedor Kuritsın görevini yapıp dönüş yolunda iken Türkler tarafından Belgrad'da durdurulmuştu. Elçi Macar Kralı ile Kırım Hanı Mengli Giray'ın tavassutu ile serbest kalmıştı. Elçi bu durum karşısında Türklerle münasebet tesis etmenin lüzumunu ve Türk paşalarının da buna taraftar olduğunu III. İvan'a anlatmıştı¹. Böylece münasebetler Kırım'da, muhtemelen Ceneviz kolonileri

* Bu makale 20-26 Ekim 1991 tarihinde Kiev'de düzenlenmiş bulunan "Ukraine and the Ottoman Empire" adlı millederarası kongrede okunmuş olan tebliğin kısmen genişletilmiş hâlidir.

¹ Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Rusya Tarihi, Başlangıçtan 1917'ye kadar*, Ankara 1948, 117-118; Osmanlı Devleti ile Rusya arasındaki ilk münasebetlerin 1475 yılında Kırım'daki pazarlarda baş-



أوكرانيا (Ukraine) في أقصى غربي روسيا الاتحادية

أوكرانيا

بطاقة تعريف

كانت «البلاد الحدودية» (أوكرانيا) هي الضفة اليمنى من نهر دنيبر الذي كان يشكل ل تخوم «روس». غربي روسيا. كثيرون من الأوكرانيين يعتبرون أن بلادهم تحتل موقعًا وسطًا بين الشرق والغرب؛ بعدما كانت تشكل جزءًا أساسيًا من الاستراتيجية السوفياتية في مواجهتها للغرب. تجاور بولونيا، وسلوفاكيا وحتى هنغاريا (المجى) بعدما ضم الاتحاد السوفياتي (في 1٩٤٥) روتانيا ووسّع حدوده إلى غربي الكاربات الوسطى ليصبح له منفذ على

الاسم: دُعيت في المصطلحات والمدونات البيزنطية «روسيا الصغرى»، لأن منطقة كييف كانت معتبرة مهد الأمة الروسية ومركز الميتروبول، في حين ان «روسيا الكبرى» كانت مجرد امتداد لها في مناطق الغابات الشمالية. وبعد ذلك أصبحت كلمة «أوكرانيا» تعني «السير» أو «المسيرة» أو «بلاد التخوم» أو «البلاد الحدودية». الموقع: تقع أوكرانيا في أوروبا. في القرن الحادي عشر

الموسوعة التاريخية الجغرافية

DN: 55912

مسعود الخوند : الجزء 4 نهرت-لبنان (1995) 91-106 s.

D 3087

02 EKIM 2007

Ukrainian Review, c. 9, 1960, Munich, s. 100-111

The Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine
The Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate

-Ukrayna

Nadiya Teodorovich

The Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian SSR is called an Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate. It is thus organizationally a "Russian" Church and lacks Ukrainian independence. Its background is as follows:

In view of the changes wrought by the 1917 Revolution in Russia, the administration of the Russian Orthodox Church could not ignore the demands of the Ukrainian Church Council, the Ukrainian clergy and the Ukrainian Government for the independent development of ecclesiastical life in the Ukraine. In 1918 the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was granted autonomy which was reconfirmed in 1922. In 1921 Patriarch Tikhon appointed an Exarch for the Ukraine.¹

By confirming the autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Tikhon had no intention whatever of trying to break up Russia and its Orthodox Church on a nationality basis and did not intend in any way to support the aspirations of Ukrainian politicians and clergy for a gradual transition from autonomy to the more independent status of autocephaly. The Exarchate of the Russian Patriarchate from 1918 to 1925 was only relatively independent, and failed to reflect the general aspirations for political independence for the Ukraine. On the other hand, Patriarch Tikhon opposed the subordination of the Church's administration to Communist control and cannot be accused of having collaborated with the Communist terrorist agencies.

In the period 1927-38, Orthodox life in all the Union Republics was gradually brought under the general control of the Moscow Patriarchate through the joint efforts of Metropolitan Sergei and the Communist Party leaders. As a result of this development, the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalic Church, which had existed in the Ukraine since 1918, was officially abolished. From 1921 to 1927 this Church had enjoyed a vigorous life of its own. As the centralizing tendencies of the Kremlin had become increasingly apparent and the Moscow Patriarchate more and more amenable to the requirements of the authorities, the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalic Church had drawn farther and farther away from Moscow and had campaigned with increasing insistence for full independence. The dissolution of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church was carried through with dire consequences for 34 bishops, more than 2,000 priests and millions of believers.² Crushed and partially driven underground, the Ukrainian Autocephalic

¹ Friedrich Heyer, *Die orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945*, Cologne, 1953, pp. 34-75.

² M. Yandas, *Ukrainska avtokefalna pravoslavna tserkva; Dokumenty dlya istorii UAPT's* (Documents on the History of the Ukrainian Autocephalic Orthodox Church), Munich 1956, p. 20.

Orthodox Church was, from 1935 onwards, powerless to resist the Moscow Patriarchate.

After Soviet incorporation of the Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR in 1939, the Moscow Patriarchate began to flood the Ukraine with its own clergy and succeeded in transforming ecclesiastical life in the Ukraine into a tool of Soviet internal and foreign policy.

The role of the Exarchate of the Ukraine in this process is of great interest.

After the annexation of the Western Ukraine to the USSR, the Moscow Patriarchate sent Metropolitan Nikolai (Yarushevich) there as Exarch. His assignment was to "put in order" ecclesiastical life in the areas hitherto free from Communist pressure and thus to facilitate their Sovietization. An early report by Metropolitan Nikolai indicates the type of difficulty experienced:

We live here as if in the past, but on a completely up-to-date level. There would be no special difficulties if it were not for those incited by our new territories. A new patch does not always stick to an old coat. Everything seems to be done after the local fashion. It is especially difficult to get them to understand that their "autocephaly," translated into ecclesiastical language, means "schism" with all the consequences which that entails. . . We are going to have much trouble with them in trying to cram the multiplication table into their heads.³

Another letter indicates the scope of the effort to organize the newly annexed territories:

There is much to be done here. Bessarabia is waiting to be organized and Bishop Aleksei (Sergiev) has been dispatched thither. Exarch Nikolai (Yarushevich) has gone to the Western Ukraine and Belorussia. We are now dealing with Latvia and Estonia.⁴

Great changes occurred as a result of the new Exarch's mission of bringing order to Western Ukraine. The Episcopate of these oblasts was subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate. The most reliable candidates were ordained bishops of the area.⁵ The clergy and monks were purged and those who resisted or opposed the new organization were shot or deported. The theological seminary in Kremenets was closed down.


The activities of the Exarch of the Ukraine during the war years are highly indicative. Since the Exarch of the Ukraine was a permanent member of the Holy Synod, his signature was attached to all the Patriarch's official statements and thus promoted Soviet policy. It should be noted that the Moscow Patriarchate during the war cooperated with the official policy of Russian patriotism, as appears in the following statement by Metropolitan Sergei in 1942:

³ *Patriarkh Sergiy i ego dukhovnoe nasledstvo* (Patriarch Sergiy and his Spiritual Heritage), published by the Moscow Patriarchy, 1947, p. 227.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 304.


MADRE SOVIETI



WESTERN UKRAINIA

Galicia; Halychnya

CAPITAL: Lwiw (Lvov)



POPULATION: (95e) 6,824,000 : 5,280,000 Western Ukrainians in Ukraine. **MAJOR NATIONAL GROUPS:** (95e) Western Ukrainian 77%, Polish 7%, Russian 2%, Moldovan 1.5%, other Ukrainian. **MAJOR LANGUAGES:** Ukrainian, Polish, Russian. **MAJOR RELIGIONS:** (95e) Uniate Catholic 64%, Ukrainian Orthodox 10%, Roman Catholic 8%, Protestant 3%, Russian Orthodox. **MAJOR CITIES:** (95e) Lwiw (Lvov) 850,000 (1,026,000), Cernivci (Chernovtsy) 284,000, Stanislaviv (Ivano-Frankovsk) 270,000, Ternopil (Ternopol) 234,000, Drohobych (Drogobych) 106,000, Cervonohrad (Chervonograd) 79,000 (118,000), Kalus (Kalush) 71,000, Kolomyja (Kolomyya) 70,000, Stryj (Stry) 66,000, Boryslav (Borislav) 48,000 (94,000).

GEOGRAPHY: AREA: 22,329 sq.mi.-57,847 sq.km. **LOCATION:** Western Ukraine occupies a flat plain, traversed by the Dniestr River and its tributaries, rising to the Carpathian Mountains in southwestern Ukraine. **POLITICAL STATUS:** Western Ukraine has no official status; the region, the historic region of Galicia, forms the Ukrainian oblasts of Lwiw, Cernivci, Ivano-Frankivs, and Ternopil.

INDEPENDENCE DECLARED: 14 November 1918; 30 June 1941.

FLAG: The Western Ukrainian flag, the flag of the national movement, is a horizontal bicolor of red over black. **OTHER FLAG(S):** The historic flag of Galicia, used by several Western Ukrainian nationalist organizations, is a horizontal bicolor of red over green.

PEOPLE: The Western Ukrainians are an East Slav people, ethnically part

of the Ukrainian nation but historically, culturally, and religiously distinct. The region's language, the southwestern dialect of Ukrainian, is quite different from the Russianized southeastern dialect spoken in Kiev and the eastern provinces. The Western Ukrainian culture, through centuries of Austrian and Polish rule, is a Central European culture and is notably free of the strong Russian influences in the culture of central and eastern Ukraine. The majority of the Western Ukrainians belong to the Byzantine rite Uniate Catholic church, with an Orthodox minority split between the Autocephalous Orthodox Church, an independent Ukrainian Orthodox sect banned in 1930, the official Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the Russian Orthodox Church.

THE NATION: Populated by East Slav tribes during the Slav migrations in the sixth century A.D. the region early came under the influence of the non-Slav peoples to the west. The Slavs of the upper Dniestr River basin became part of Kievan Rus, the first great East Slav state, in 1054. Within fifty years Kievan Rus had fragmented into twelve principalities. The most southerly of the principalities, Galicia, lay on the frontier between the Latins and Byzantines.

Separated from Russian territory by the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century, Galicia eventually came under Tatar rule in 1324. The Poles liberated and annexed the region in 1349, and in 1386 Galicia became part of the merged Polish-Lithuanian state. The Roman Catholic Poles, intent on converting the state's Orthodox subjects, agreed to a compromise in 1596. The Orthodox Ukrainians formed a union with Rome and accepted the pope as their spiritual leader but retained the Byzantine religious rite and their own hierarchy, their priests preserving the right to marry.

Galicia, with a mixed population of Ukrainians and Poles, became part of Austria as a result of the first Polish partition in 1772. The southeastern area around Cernivci, the region of Bukovina, was added to Austrian Galicia three years later. Better educated and less restricted than the Ukrainians under Russian rule, the Western Ukrainian culture and language developed separately, influenced by Vienna and Krakow, not Kiev or Moscow.

Lemberg (Lwiw) emerged as the principal center of Ukrainian nationalism in the Hapsburg Empire in the nineteenth century. The Uniate Church, closely tied to Western Ukrainian culture, provided the focus of Western Ukrainian nationalism.

A border region on the frontier with Russia, Galicia became a battleground when war began in 1914. As Austro-Hungarian defeat neared in October 1918, Western Ukrainian nationalists organized to oppose Polish and Romanian claims on the region. On 14 November 1918 nationalist leaders declared the independence of Galicia. Romanian troops invaded the new state to occupy the southeastern region of Bukovina, but a hastily organized national army repulsed the Poles in 1919. Threatened on all sides, the Western Ukrainians voted for union with newly independent Ukraine despite vigorous opposition to the union on religious and cultural grounds. After the Soviet occupation of central and eastern Ukraine, Polish troops overran the region during the Polish-Soviet War in 1919.

O. B. HAZIRAN 1999




Figure 13. A distant view of Šamharūs's setting



Figure 14. The Duwār of Arəmd from a different angle





Figure 15. A mağdūb with his family and patients on their way to Sidi Šamharūs



Figure 16. The cultivation of floored terraces

Ukrayna



Bulletin critique

David WAINES, *The Odyssey of Ibn Battuta. Uncommon Tales of a Medieval Adventurer*, Londres, I.B. Tauris, 2010, relié, 240 p. + encart de 20 illustrations (12 p.) + carte sommaire de l'itinéraire, ISBN: 978-1-84511-805-1, 25 £. R

David Waines (désormais D.W.), Professeur émérite à l'Université de Lancaster, a écrit un ouvrage de type *companion* consacré à la *Rihla*¹ d'Ibn Baṭṭūta. Après une présentation du texte, de ses auteurs, de sa réception et de ses critiques, l'auteur brosse les grands tableaux d'une riche odyssee. Puis il choisit de livrer ce corpus à une analyse thématique autour des points suivants: hospitalité, spiritualité et altérité.

Le premier chapitre, «Travel Tales, their Creators and Critics» (p. 1-26), rappelle tout d'abord que les routes du monde médiéval furent parcourues par quantité de voyageurs, pour des motifs fort divers, les protagonistes de ces mouvements physiques recourant à des professionnels spécialisés, capables de traverser toutes les configurations géographiques, *barran wa-babran*. L'époque connut une intense activité transcontinentale² et d'importantes migrations. Malgré cela, peu de *rihla*s ont été consignées et/ou nous sont parvenues: *great travellers did not make travel writers* (p. 3, l'auteur renvoyant à al-Mas'ūdī ou al-Muqaddasī). Marco Polo (1255-1324, *itin.* 1272-1295) et Ibn Baṭṭūta (1304-1368 ou 1377, *itin.* 1325-1354) quittent leur patrie jeunes, partent loin et longtemps, puis dictent à leur retour un volumineux *travelogue* à un nègre littéraire (respectivement Rustichello et Ibn Ğuzayy) chargé de produire un compte rendu cohérent à partir d'une masse considérable d'informations.

La réception initiale de leurs relations, outre qu'elle se confronte à un *autre monde*, la Chine, suscite d'emblée maints débats sur la véracité des contenus. Cela n'empêche nullement la *Tuhfa* de devenir rapidement populaire dans le monde arabe (comme en témoignent les nombreux manuscrits en circulation). Son édition bilingue

¹ Les éditions de référence de D.W. sont: *Tuhfat al-nuẓẓār fi ḡarā'ib al-aṣṣār wa-'aḡā'ib al-asfār*, éd. 'Abd al-Hādī l-Tāzī, 5 vols + 1 addenda, Rabat, Maṭbū'at Akādīmiyyat al-Mamlaka l-maġribiyya («silsilat al-turāt»), 1417/1997; *Voyages d'Ibn Baṭṭūta. Texte arabe, accompagné d'une traduction par C. Defrémery et B.R. Sanguinetti*, 4 vols, Paris, La Société Asiatique (Imprimerie impériale), 1853-8; *The Travels of Ibn Battuta AD 1325-1354*, trans. H.A.R. Gibb, 3 vols, New Delhi, Munshiram Mooharlal Publishers, 2004; le 4^e vol.: trans. with annotations H.A.R. Gibb et C.F. Beckingham, Londres, Hakluyt Society, 1994.

² Nous renvoyons aux travaux des historiens du courant post-marxiste des «systèmes-monde», en particulier pour l'époque qui nous occupe – celle de la *Pax mongolica* de Jean de Plan Carpin, Guillaume de Rubrouck, Marco Polo, Ibn Baṭṭūta – à Janet L. Abu Lughod, *Before European Hegemony. The World System A.D. 1250-1350*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991.

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Islam and Muslims in Contemporary Ukraine: Common Backgrounds, Different Images

Ukrayna

MYKHAYLO YAKUBOVYCH

ABSTRACT

Islam in Ukraine has its roots in the Middle Ages and is mostly associated with the Crimean Tatars. Muslims were repressed in the Soviet period, when most of the Tatars were deported from their homeland to Central Asia. Ukrainian independence opened a new era in the development of Islam; the last two decades (1989–2009) were the formative period for Muslim religious institutions. On the basis of the most recent sources, I argue that the Ukrainian part of the Islamic umma has been influenced by various foreign religious organisations. Using all possible forms of Islamic activism, various groups (like Hizb ut-Tahrir) have been formulating what they call an Islamic social and political position in relation to the main issues in Ukrainian society today. Their efforts have led to heated discussion among Ukrainian Muslim activists, scholars and politicians. We observe a politicisation of Islamic activism and an ideological clash between traditional institutions and newly founded Islamic communities.

Introduction

Less attention has been paid than one might expect in western Islamic studies to the essential characteristics of the Islamic populations of Eastern Europe today. In recent publications (for example Cesari, 2009; Amghar *et al.*, 2007) the main focus has been on the countries of European Union, while other European states have often been considered individually (see for example Islam, 2006). This perspective arises out of the particular geopolitical position of the European Union; but it fails to take adequately into account the fact that the historical development of Islam has been of a different nature in different European countries. A Muslim population is indigenous in such countries as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European part of Russia and Ukrainian Crimea; the 'autochthony' of Islam in these countries makes the religious situation there quite different from that of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and other European countries where all Muslims are being seen as foreign incomers and immigrants (Caldwell, 2009). Moreover, Ukraine is presented with a unique situation: the problematic repatriation since the late 1980s of Crimean Tatars, who were deported *en masse* from their native land in 1944 under Stalin. In the last two decades (1990–2010), Islam in Ukraine has been influenced by totally new processes which are similar to those at work in other European countries; at the same time these processes are shaped by the particular features of Ukrainian social and political life.

Is There Political Islam in Ukraine?

ALEXANDER BOGOMOLOV and SERGE DANYLOV

This article summarizes the main demographic and statistical data, and gives a preliminary analysis, of some important trends characteristic of Ukrainian Islam. A typology of Islamic communities has been attempted based mainly on the criteria of geographic distribution and ethnic variety. The complex phenomenon of Islamic revival is looked at mainly from a political and social angle with a specific focus on how religious affiliation interplays with other group identities and competing ideologies. The general European context has been taken into account whenever appropriate.

In a matter of only a few years Islam has become a subject of public discussion in Ukraine. For the academic researcher it also remains a relatively new area. We could refer the reader to only two predecessors who have approached the subject so far.¹ A study of a new social phenomenon necessarily faces a set of objective and subjective constraints. The most important of them relates to the nature of the material available for scrutiny.

We have used two sets of data for this study – some fieldwork material and a relatively large sample of media discourse available in electronic and print format. The fieldwork data we were able to obtain were largely limited to a number of interviews carried out while undertaking two projects which facilitated contact with some of the relevant target groups,² and to some direct observations. Ongoing contact with some of the Muslim groups and personalities also proved to be helpful. Systematic Islam-specific fieldwork, which could result in a more thorough survey, still needs to be carried out.

The media discourse material is of two different types – that produced by the Muslim organizations and that produced by external observers, primarily the media. Based on the media discourse and observable actions and decisions by the government we can draw some preliminary conclusions about the positions taken by actors outside the Muslim context.

When analyzing the media discourse, one needs to distinguish between religiosity per se and the role of views and beliefs in the policies of religious organizations with respect to each other and to external actors. The confusion between the two usually results in a discussion over correct or incorrect Islam, which is neither the legitimate subject of academic research, nor helps address the security concerns related to the activities of certain Islamic groups.

Alexander Bogomolov is President of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Ukraine. Serge Danylov is a senior fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Ukraine.