

especially Abū l-Hudhayl. They were, essentially, (a) God's will and willing and (b) his power to do what is unjust.

3.2.2.2.4.2.2.1 Willing and Creating

In Nazzām's model the complicated theories by means of which Abū l-Hudhayl had attempted to render the process of creation more comprehensible, have vanished. He was not familiar with accidents 'without location', and if he had believed in the *fiat*, he would have had to explain it differently as it was a sound. In his view there was one accident only: movement, and he did indeed interpret the creation of things as directed movement.¹ This movement, being an accident, could of course only be inherent in things themselves; God had imbued them with it. In God, on the other hand, nothing moves; from his point of view, creation is an act of will.

Nazzām knew from theological tradition that God's willing can change its character depending on its sphere of application. This was due to the dogma of human free will, a subject he discussed a number of times.² He enriched the debate by analysing the concept of 'willing' from the point of view of linguistic usage with unprecedented discriminatory power. He distinguished five senses in all:

- 1) to will/want to = to have in mind, to intend
- 2) to will/want to = to command, to order
- 3) to will/want to = to decree that something will come to pass
- 4) to will/want to = to realise, to call to life
- 5) to will/want to = to be about to (e.g. 'the milk will boil')³

No. 5 could be put aside immediately. This usage was found in the Quran, and his example came from there: 'a wall about to tumble down' (sura 18:77), but it was about an object and not a person. No. 1, too, had to be left out for – and this is not immediately plausible – God has no 'mind' (*damīr*).⁴ This makes us wonder whether this is not a verbal fallacy; after all 'to intend' is just as valid a definition as 'to have in mind'. Nazzām, however, was looking at the substance: in this context 'will' expresses an intention the realisation of which is not assured as it is in the future. One thinks of doing something, like a human plans an

1 See p. 352f. above.

2 Catalogue of Works no. 10 and 12, perhaps also no. 9 and no. 14–15.

3 Text 197, a–b; 196, c.

4 Text 197, c; thus also later the Zaydite al-Mahdī li-dīn Allāh (cf. MUSJ 49/1975–6/670).

based on the Quran being not speech about God but God's own speech;³⁷ if God had his own language, we could not understand him at all. However, on the field of linguistic theory in particular the axiom reached its limits.³⁸

1.3.2.1 Divine Will and the Creation

The problems posed by univocal language usage could be avoided by means of lexically differentiating between divine and human qualities. It is no coincidence that the theological discourse gradually used *qudra* less in connection with humans, instead using *istiṭā'a* (which was never applied to God). Those who paraphrased human actions as *kasb* or *iktisāb* avoided not only the word *khalaqa* but also *fa'ala*.¹ Of course, evasive manoeuvres of this kind were not always possible. Jāhiz, for instance, saw that a human act of will has a different structure than a divine one;² there were even attempts to grasp the problem doxographically.³ However, usually the difference was defined by the result: a human cannot be certain whether what he intends will come to pass, while in the case of God, whose power is not impeded by any external factors, the act of will occurs in the same instant as its implementation. That which he wills comes to pass without delay (*bilā faṣl*),⁴ which implies that God's acts of will do not have any independent existence; certainly, they have no temporal extension.⁵ This was precisely how it had been intended. In the understanding of language of the time will (*irāda*) was willing or intending, a single act of will and thus not permanent. Consequently it was neither necessary nor advisable to call it eternal.⁶ 'God has willed for all eternity' means 'He has known for all eternity what he wills (or is going to will)'; Naẓẓām put it;⁷ this was the only way to prevent extending God's will to become predestination.⁸ Najjār was the first to embrace a consistent opposition; before him the idea that will was one of

37 See p. 683ff. below.

38 See p. 209ff. above, also Frank, loc. cit. 32f.

1 See p. 186 and 192 above.

2 See p. 120f. and 123f. above.

3 Possibly rather late; cf. Malāḥimī, *Mu'tamad* 240, 2ff.

4 Cf. Text XXI 125 regarding Abū l-Hudhayl; cf. vol. III 267 above. Regarding Naẓẓām ibid. 435f. Concerning *bilā faṣl* cf. vol. V 318 and 431 (of the German edition).

5 Rudolph, *Pseudo-Ammonios* 200 regarding Ḍirār and Naẓẓām.

6 See vol. III 88f. above regarding Mu'ammār. In Abū l-Hudhayl's view the divine act of will was an accident (vol. III 302 above).

7 See vol. III 437 above.

8 Muḥāsibī pointed this out, albeit under the opposite aspect (*Fahm al-Qur'ān* 341, 9ff.). Regarding the development in general cf. Alousi, *The Problem of Creation in Islamic Thought* 224ff.